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“The most important point is, in a time of crisis, there is no way out
but for the government to be bold and aggressive.”
Mark Zandi 1
I. INTRODUCTION
By now many homeowners have heard about the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act that resulted from the 2007 financial crisis,
which continues to loom over homeowners who own underwater
properties. 2 On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed a bill that
extended the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act through December
31, 2016, providing an extension of the law and retroactive coverage for
mortgage debt cancelled in 2015 so that homeowners do not have to pay
taxes on forgiven debt from the sale of their principal residences. 3
In March 2015, between 6 million and 9.7 million homes nationwide
were underwater, meaning the loan balance was greater than the property
value. 4 With an underwater property, also known as an upside-down
1. See generally MARK ZANDI, PAYING THE PRICE: ENDING THE GREAT RECESSION AND
BEGINNING A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY (2013). Mark M. Zandi is chief economist of Moody’s
Analytics, where he directs economic research. Moody’s Analytics, a subsidiary of Moody’s Corp.,
is a leading provider of economic research, data and analytical tools. Mark Zandi, MOODY’S
ANALYTICS, https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/index (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
2. “Underwater” is a term of art coined after the 2007 financial crisis, which led to a
catastrophic decline in residential property values for millions of homeowners whose significantly
devalued property values were worth far less than the remaining mortgage balances. See generally
PETER DEIER ET AL., UNDERWATER AMERICA 5 (Haas Inst. ed., 2014),
http://diversity.berkeley.edu/underwater-america-report (last visited Dec. 11, 2014). See also FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 495 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT];
Christopher Matthews, After 8 Years, The Real Estate Market is Finally Looking Normal Again,
FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/03/31/after-8-years-thereal-estate-market-is-finally-looking-normal-again/.
3. Peter Thomas Ricci, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act Extended to 2017, BOSTON AGENT
MAGAZINE (Dec. 21, 2015), https://bostonagentmagazine.com/2015/12/21/mortgage-forgivenessdebt-act-extended-to-2017/.
4. Florida, for example, has had in excess of 1 million of those properties. Drew Harwell,
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property, homeowners who sold their property for less than they owed
faced tax consequences. What owning underwater property means for
homeowners is that the home’s current market value is less than the
mortgage balance, making it impossible to sell or refinance the home
without the lender’s cooperation. Many homeowners, who may be in
financial distress and can no longer afford their homes because of national
or personal financial crises, 5 cannot sell their underwater property 6
without their lender’s agreement to accept less than the mortgage loan
balance upon the sale of the property. Lender approval of this type of
transaction is necessary for many current homeowners trying to sell their
homes in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, which has left many
Expiration of Mortgage-Forgiveness Tax Break Triggers Fears for Distressed Homeowners, TAMPA
BAY NEWS, http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/mortgage-forgiveness-tax-breakexpires-triggering-new-worries-for/2160925 (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). See also Tory Barringer, 9.7
Million Homeowners Underwater, DS NEWS, http://dsnews.com/news/05-20-2014/9-7-millionhomeowners-underwater (last visited Jul. 25, 2014); 9.1 Million U.S. Residential Properties Seriously
Underwater in First Quarter, Lowest Level in Two Years, REALTYTRAC (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/q1-2014-home-equity-andunderwater-report-8037 (reporting 17% of U.S. properties are seriously underwater, down from 26%
a year ago); Erin Carlyle, Study Finds 6.4 Million U.S. Homeowners Still Have
Underwater Mortgages, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/erincarlyle/2013/12/17/6-4-million-still-have-underwater-mortgages-as-of-q3-2013-sayscorelogic/ (noting that underwater properties are “often called ‘upside down’ or ‘negative equity’
properties, meaning that borrowers owe more on their mortgages than the homes are worth”); 8.1
Million U.S. Residential Properties Seriously Underwater in Third Quarter, Lowest Level in Two
Years, REALTYTRAC (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-marketreport/q3-2014-us-home-equity-and-underwater-report-8166 (stating that 8.1 million U.S. residential
properties were seriously underwater, “representing 15 percent of all properties with a mortgage and
an estimated $1.4 trillion in negative equity”). It appears from its website that CoreLogic began
regularly publishing its Negative Equity Report for residential real estate around 2010, upon which
the real estate and financial industries and media sources rely. See generally CORELOGIC,
www.corelogic.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
5. The distress of financial crisis left many Americans unemployed, underemployed, or forced
to relocate to other communities/cities for work or better opportunities. The exodus in many
communities forced homeowners to abandon homes they could no longer afford, causing historic
foreclosure rates in both middle class and lower-income communities. Stanley Fischer, Vice
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech, At the “The Great
Recession—Moving Ahead,” a Conference Sponsored by the Swedish Ministry of Finance,
Stockholm,
Sweden
(Aug.
11,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/fischer20140811a.htm. For example, “job cuts at federal, state, and local governments have
reduced payrolls by almost 3/4 of a million workers, resulting in a decline in total government civilian
employment of 3-1/4 percent since its peak in early 2009.” Id. Further strengthening of the economy
will likely pull some of workers back into the labor market, although skills and networks may have
depreciated some over the past years. Id. See also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 203.
6. Current Market Value, as the author uses the concept, means what a willing third party
buyer would pay for the property at the time of contracting with the homeowner, based on either
current appraisal values or values of similar properties recently sold in the same area. See generally
Guide Note 11: Comparable Selection in a Declining Market, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE,
http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/assets/1/7/guide-note-11.pdf.
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American homeowners unemployed, underemployed, or forced to
relocate to other communities for better opportunities. 7
Homeowners who are willing to sell their homes to relieve their
financial distress need their lender’s approval to accept a lesser amount
than the existing mortgage balance in order to facilitate the real estate
sales transaction at the deflated current market value. The mortgage
lending and real estate sales industries refer to this type of real estate sales
transaction as a “short sale,” or for purposes of this Article, a “mortgage
short sale transaction,” 8 or MSST, so as not to confuse the concept of a
short sale as it is used in the securities market context. 9 To use the MSST,
homeowners and lenders must come to an agreement about the reduced
payoff amount of the mortgage in order for the homeowner to complete
the real estate transaction with the purchaser. 10 The impact on lenders is
that they more quickly receive a substantial amount of the mortgage
balance versus allowing the property to go through the more costly
foreclosure process. Lenders further incur a tax write-off for business loss
on the forgiven loan balance. 11 More importantly, lenders do not take
7. The exodus in many communities forced homeowners to abandon homes they could no
longer afford, causing historic foreclosure rates in both middle class and lower-income communities.
Joshua Gardner, Skeletons of the Great Recession: These American Cities Are Still Plagued by Homes
(Jul.
14,
2014,
5:23
AM),
Abandoned
to
Foreclosure,
DAILYMAIL
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2691092/Skeletons-Great-Recession-These-Americancities-plagued-homes-abandoned-foreclosure.html. See generally The Housing Crisis and the
Working Poor, CASAS DEL PUEBLO COMMUNITY LAND TRUST (Oct. 2013), http://cltnetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/2013-The-Housing-Crisis-and-Working-Poor.pdf.
8. See MADISON, ET AL., 2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 12:10, Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2015) (detailing residential real estate short sale procedure context); see also 33A AM.
JUR.2d Federal Taxation ¶ 10232, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2016) (listing examples of how
short sales are used including a short sale in the securities context where a contract for the sale of
shares which the seller does not own or the certificates for which are not within his control so as to
be available for delivery at the time when the delivery must be made). A full discussion of a securities
short sale is beyond the scope of this Article and does not have the same meaning and application as
an MSST discussed herein. See also KRISTY A. HERNANDEZ, EDUCATING UNDERWATER
HOMEOWNERS ON THE OPTIONS FOR KEEPING OR LEAVING THEIR HOMES (Aspatore, Oct. 2012),
2012 WL 4364153.
9. Michael A. Valenza, Digest of Selected Articles, 38 REAL EST. L.J. 122, 122 (2009). Only
a few years ago residential real estate mortgage “short sales were an unheard of occurrence in most
markets.” Id. See also Phil M. Fowler, Legal Definition of a Short Sale, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/legal-definition-short-sale-7218.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2014);
CORELOGIC, supra note 4.
10. “A Short Sale is where the lender or investor agrees to accept an amount less than is
actually owed on the property.” Alexander von Bryce, Short Sale vs. Short Payoff—Advantages and
Disadvantages of Each, NEW HAMPSHIRE SHORT SALE CENTER (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://nhshortsalecenter.com/2011/02/14/short-sale-vs-short-payoff-advantages-and-disadvantagesof-each/.
11. “Creditors often write off debts after a set period of time—for example, one, two, or three
years after you default. The creditor stops its collection efforts, declares the debt uncollectible, and
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ownership of, or liability for, the property. For homeowners, the results
are not so positive. They are able to sell their underwater property, but,
consequentially, they lose all their paid-in or market-incurred equity and
incur tax liability from the lender’s forgiveness of indebtedness of the
mortgage balance. Thus, given these outcomes, the tax implication of
MSSTs is inequitably balanced in lenders’ favor, while, for homeowners,
the transaction creates new financial distress because of the tax liability
consequences.
In the current market, with almost ten million homes still underwater,
MSSTs are often the only way for homeowners to sell their property. 12
For homeowners who do not fully understand, or are completely
unknowledgeable about, the tax consequences of MSSTs, MSSTs seem
like a win-win situation for themselves and lenders, especially with the
government, lenders, and real estate sales professionals marketing MSSTs
to homeowners. This win-win perception, however, is a fallacy. For
homeowners, the perception is that they are now able to sell the property
to relieve the financial stress of making mortgage payments, more freely
relocate for work, and avoid the stress of foreclosure of their property.
Emancipation from the mortgage allows them to pursue other life choices.
This perception, however, does not follow the reality of MSSTs.
Homeowners may find themselves in a worse financial situation with an
MSST because of a tax liability, with accruing interest and penalties, that
can plague homeowners up to seven years after entering into the MSST.
Lenders, on the other hand, realize substantial benefits from MSSTs while
ignoring the financial detriment to homeowners because any deference
they give to homeowners’ interests would be in direct conflict with their
own profitable interests. Traditionally, profit motivation forces lenders
not to make concessions or take actions that would affect their
profitability. Foreclosure proceedings and assuming title to the property,
it turns out, affect their bottom line more than MSSTs. Lenders’ reality,
not perception, is that they avoid greater losses through MSSTs of
underwater property than lenders would through a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure or their own subsequent sale of the property to a third-party
buyer. 13 Thus, the win-win scenario of an MSST is a fallacy.
reports it to the IRS as lost income to reduce its tax burden.” Tax Consequences When a Creditor
Writes Off or Settles a Debt, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tax-consequencessettled-forgiven-debt-29792.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
12. See Carlyle, supra note 4. Underwater homes are commonly known as “‘upside down’ or
‘negative equity’ properties, meaning that borrowers owe more on their mortgages than the homes
are worth.” Id.
13. “It is also likely, given the current housing environment, that John’s lender nets a greater
return through a short sale of the property than the lender would have received, if it had taken back
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Moreover, under the current industry practice, and to avoid the
unauthorized practice of law, Realtors who engage in MSSTs, and
logically lenders too, are under no legal obligation to disclose the financial
disadvantages homeowners may face with an MSST or to suggest other
less financially burdensome options of disposing of the property, such as
foreclosure. 14 As far as lenders and real estate sales professionals are
concerned, they walk away from MSSTs with a mortgage loan balance
removed from liabilities on their balance sheet, no obligation to manage
or sell a post-foreclosure property, or a commission check for their
services.
The quagmire 15 of financial indebtedness created by current tax laws
and policy related to MSSTs for homeowners, however, imposes an
onerous burden on taxpayers selling underwater properties. The
government and lenders, through various programs implemented to help
distressed homeowners with underwater properties, have instilled a belief
among homeowners that MSSTs are a positive vehicle for selling their
underwater properties. This holds true especially because the government
prioritized homeownership-related tax policy to promote homeownership
beginning with Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1933. But prior to 2007, MSSTs
were virtually non-existent. There is very little literature about, or
statistics on, MSSTs, likely because of the private nature of the transaction
between homeowners and lenders. By forgiving the mortgage loan
the property through nonjudicial foreclosure and subsequently sold it to a third party.” SENATE
BANKING AND FINANCE INSTITUTIONS COMMITTEE, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 412, as amended
21,
2011,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0401MARCH
0450/sb_412_cfa_20110405_150830_sen_comm.html [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS, SB 412].
14. See generally The Short Sale Flow: What the Listing Agent Should Know to Successfully Negotiate a Short
Sale, Risk Management, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/law-andethics/risk-management/the-short-sale-workflow (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). The National Association of
Realtors advises its Realtors not to provide legal or financial advice. It provides in almost all its disclosures the following
language, or something similar:
IT IS NOT INTENDED TO AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL, FINANCIAL OR
TAX ADVICE, AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS POLICY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. TO THE EXTENT LEGAL, FINANCIAL OR TAX
ADVICE IS NEEDED BY A MEMBER OR A MEMBER’S CLIENT OR CUSTOMER,
THOSE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONSULT WITH THEIR
LAWYER OR ACCOUNTANT.
Id.
15. Quagmire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/quagmire?show=0&t=1418310421 (last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (defining quagmire as “a
difficulty,
precarious
or
entrapping
position”);
Quagmire,
DICTONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/quagmire?s=t (last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (defining quagmire
as “a situation from which extrication is very difficult,” such as a quagmire of financial indebtedness).
For this Article, the federal tax liability one owes to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is a quagmire
of financial indebtedness.
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balance, however, lenders expose homeowners to two situations. First,
homeowners face exposure to possible deficiency judgments for the
amounts of the forgiven loan balances, which some state laws address. 16
Second, homeowners incur potential, unavoidable tax liability 17 created
by federal and state tax laws for the forgiven indebtedness, which is
considered taxable income. It is the quagmire of the latter of these two
situations facing middle-class homeowners with properties underwater
that this Article addresses.
The discussion among scholars on the issues affecting homeowners
engaging in MSSTs in the residential real estate market is very limited.
This Article not only provides a critique of the government’s tax and
public policies, but also presents an analysis that exposes the
contradictions of the transactional relationship between homeowners and
lenders in MSSTs. Furthermore, the Article focuses on the laws regarding
MSSTs that seem to provide a consumer protection focus, but, in reality,
16. Currently, several states have passed deficiency judgments legislation, or non-recourse
statutes, which bar lenders from collecting a deficiency balance, specifically after a foreclosure but
which may also cover MSSTs. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45 (LEXIS, through the 2015 First Regular
Session and the First, Second, and Third Special Sessions of the Twenty-Ninth State Legislature);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-729.A, 814.G (LEXIS, through 2016 emergency legislation effective
as of April 5, 2016); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (LEXIS, through Chapter 11 of the 2016 Regular
Session and Chapter 3 of the 2015-16 2nd Extraordinary Session); FLA. STAT. § 702.06(2) (LEXIS,
through Chapter 243 with the exception of Chapters 16, 40, 140, 160, 178, 220, 224, and 231), as
amended by Fla. H.B. 35; IOWA CODE § 654.6 (LEXIS, through all legislation signed as of May 12,
2016 from the 2016 Second Regular Session of the 86th General Assembly); MINN. STAT. § 582.30
(LEXIS, through Act chapter 84 of the 2016 Regular Session); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232
(LEXIS, current through 2015 Legislative Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.36, 45-21.38 (LEXIS,
through Session Laws 2016-3, 2016 2nd Extra Session, but not including corrections and changes
made by the Revisor of Statutes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-03 (LEXIS, through all acts signed by
the governor through the end of 2015 Regular Legislative Session including changes and corrections
made by the North Dakota Code Revisor); OR. REV. STAT. § 88.103 (LEXIS, through all Acts of the
2016 Legislative Session (1-124) with the exception of ORS Chapters 163A, 181A, 350, 431A, 475B,
and 743B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.04 (LEXIS, current through 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12
(LEXIS, current through 2015 3rd Special Session and 2015 election (2016 c 1 and 2)). California
has the broadest protection for borrowers among the statutes. See also Kathleen K. Wright, Short
ANALYST
31
(Jan.
6,
2014),
Sales
as
Nonrecourse
Mortgages,
TAX
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/71st0027.pdf. One-action statutes allow lenders a choice between an
action of foreclosure or suing to collect the debt, but not both. List of Non-Recourse Mortgage States
A
CONSUMER’S
GUIDE
TO
HELOC
LOANS,
and
Statutes,
HELOCBASICS:
http://www.helocbasics.com/list-of-non-recourse-mortgage-states-and-anti-deficiency-statutes/ (last
visited Dec. 13, 2014). The following states have some type of one-action statute: California, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New York, and Utah. Id.
17. Tax burden here not only means the financial liability but the unchallengeable collection
methods the IRS invokes for collection of the financial liability. See Tanina Rostain & Milton C.
LAW
(2014),
Regan
Jr.,
The
IRS
Under
Siege,
GEORGETOWN
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/georgetown-law-magazine/upload/54-61_facultyarticle_WEB.pdf.
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provide incentives that do not benefit consumers, or in this case,
homeowners. In this respect, one must acknowledge that MSSTs have
created a hardship on consumers. In this vein, the government and lending
industry roles in perpetuating MSSTs are an example of the failure of
pragmatic lawmaking to address the needs of citizens in a time of crisis,
particularly the 2007 financial crisis.
Thus, the scope of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article
contextualizes the evolution of MSSTs as a lender’s tool used to avoid
owning underwater real property through the foreclosure process and to
avoid the resulting liability exposures associated with properties owned
by lenders, known as REOs, or Real Estate Owned by Lenders. In
particular, it identifies how government and lender promotion of MSSTs
as a solution to homeowners’ financial burdens of owning or being unable
to sell underwater property is only a cognitive perception. In reality, the
true benefits are realized by lenders through minimized losses and by the
government through potential tax revenues, which is contrary to decades
of economic and public policy based on the need for public housing.
Second, this Article criticizes the government for the lack of pragmatic
current federal tax laws and policies to provide comprehensive relief for
homeowners with underwater properties. 18 The Article does not stop with
criticism of present policy. Instead, this Article provides a proposal for
amending existing legislation that would permit use of MSSTs to provide
the type of relief for homeowners that remains vital. The pragmatic tax
relief proposed in this Article is needed to remedy the inadequacies of
existing federal tax laws and the failure of newly created tax laws to take
into account the evolutionary realities of the real estate markets since the
2007 financial crisis for homeowners with underwater properties, which
still plague the current real estate market. The government should amend
the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 to incorporate: the
same exclusionary treatment for secondary homes as principal homes; the
inclusion of a principal residence that changes status due to economic
hardship but qualified as a principal residence any time after 2007; an
exclusion from taxable income similar to the I.R.C. § 121, for either a
principal residence to a secondary residence; and an extension of these
18. Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 provisions apply to debt forgiven in
calendar years 2007 through 2016. Pub. L. 110-142, H.R. 3648, was originally enacted in 2007 (for
three years), renewed for three additional years through December 31, 2013, renewed in December
2014 to cover tax year 2014, renewed in December 2015 to cover tax year 2015 . See I.R.C. §
108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, DEP’T OF THE TREAS., PUBLICATION 4681, CANCELLED DEBTS, FORECLOSURES,
REPOSSESSIONS, AND ABANDONMENTS (FOR INDIVIDUALS) (2015) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION
4681].
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provisions until the underwater property market is eliminated, or at a
superficial volume. The lack of scholarship addressing these specific
issues, 19 especially as it pertains to the potential tax liability for
homeowners with underwater properties, makes this Article particularly
pertinent to the scholarly discussion.
Part II contends that governmental public policy, particularly, social
policy which reflects the social values or norms of its citizens, should be
implemented to address the disparities that arise given the lenderconsumer relational dynamics that typically result in more harm than
benefit for consumers, specifically related to MSSTs discussed in this
Article.
Part III provides a much-needed historical context for the
introduction of MSSTs into the residential real estate finance market after
the 2007 financial crisis. This section identifies the illusory advantages
and tangible disadvantages to homeowners, primarily tax-related, when
engaging in MSSTs. It contrasts these disadvantages with the low risk to
lenders for approving MSSTs. (Part III also notes that the current tax
policy underlying MSSTs is contrary to America’s long standing public
policy that emphasizes home ownership.)
Part IV of this Article analyzes existing tax treatment of MSST
transactions and provides a critique of the solvency rules affecting middleclass taxpayers. It suggests that Congress’s tax treatment of MSSTs, to
date through the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, of 2007 has been
insufficient in several ways and that Congress should apply a broader
scope to existing, and any newly created, tax laws in order to provide
meaningful tax relief to middle-class taxpayers with underwater principal
and underwater secondary residences.
Part V proposes alternatives to MSSTs that homeowners can
consider to avoid the onerous tax liabilities and suggests antidotes for
policymakers to implement meaningful federal tax policy reform still
needed to rescue middle-class homeowners from the potential tax burdens
associated with MSSTs. Part V suggests that Congress should follow the
pattern created in the special agreement in place for California, which is
the only state to date that has secured a special agreement with the IRS to
19. Some debate has arisen that generally discusses the need to extend a tax exception that
allows taxpayers to avoid liability for cancellation of indebtedness. See Dustin A. Zacks, Avoid Insult
to Injury: Extending and Expanding Cancellation of Indebtedness Income Tax Exemption for
Homeowners, 66 ARK. L. REV. 317 (2013); see also Bradford P. Anderson, Robbing Peter To Pay
for Paul’s Residential Real Estate Speculation: The Injustice of Not Taxing Forgiven Mortgage Debt,
36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 10 (2011). These articles fail to discuss the various circumstances in
which such exceptions would apply and the actual burdens placed on taxpayers if Congress does not
take action, or to give any context for which the financial crisis contributed to this problem.
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allow a residence to avoid tax liability from MSSTs regardless of
solvency, relating to a principal residence. The Article also suggests that
Congress should extend the scope of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt
Relief Act of 2007 (MFRDA); provide similar, favorable treatment for
principal and secondary residences; exclude residences from taxable
income; and take other government “paternalistic” actions to assist
homeowners with underwater property. The financial crisis that led to the
tremendous amount of underwater property was a catastrophic
earthquake, the after-shocks of which will continue for many years to
come, and the government must come to its citizens’ aid in this time of
crisis.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY REASON FOR TAX RELIEF FOR MSSTS
The strength of American democracy lies in its social values. 20
Public policy reflects social values, and policy influences public choice. 21
The government’s public policy is often revealed through the legislation
it enacts to address social concerns and to protect the well-being of its
citizens, e.g., when it passes new laws, or provides public services, to
redress the current problems affecting its citizens. 22 The government’s
goal in implementing changes in the law, or offering services, is often to
correct societal maladies that affect the economic welfare of the nation,
and, ultimately, to improve the quality of life for its citizens. 23
The federal government has long been committed to providing “a
decent home and suitable living environment” for all its citizens. 24
Traditionally, the federal government has supported and initiated policy
to promote homeownership through legislation aimed at benefiting its
citizens, starting with the various New Deal laws enacted in the 1930s
during the Roosevelt Administration 25 and continuing through the 1990s
20. See DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY ix (Milton M. Carrow, et al., eds.
1998).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in American Grain: Reclaiming
Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 59 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel eds., Oxford University Press 2009).
24. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949), codified as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1441 (1949).
25. Tracie R. Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed: The Banking and Financial Services
Industry’s Capture of Federal Homeownership Policy and the Impact on Citizen Homeowners, 37
HAMLINE L. REV. 139, 155-56 (2013) (discussing the homeownership policy integral to Roosevelt’s
plan for recovery of the national economy and for individual homeowners, through passage of several
instrumental federal laws). The New Deal laws dealt with sweeping reforms to deal with a broad
range of maladies that plagued citizens after the 1920’s financial collapse, particularly in the real
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during the George W. Bush administration. 26 Thus, the government’s
influence on and endorsement of its citizens becoming homeowners is
well entrenched in the government’s public policy platform. 27 The
government’s actions in redressing the current crisis in home ownership
caused by the large quantity of underwater property should not be myopic
because the legislation not only benefits its citizens, but it also strengthens
the national economy. Therefore, in the current depressed real estate
market, with millions of citizens who own homes that are underwater,
Congress should enact new legislation or modify existing legislation to
address the severe tax liability implications for homeowners. This
legislation would promote home ownership, which has been a
foundational principle of the American economy. This aid is especially
necessary for homeowners who find that MSSTs are the best means by
which to sell their homes. 28 The federal government, therefore, should
promulgate a new and practical homeownership tax policy that does not
create onerous tax liabilities for taxpayers, given that prior policies
incentivized taxpayers to become homeowners. The tax savings benefits
from homeownership relate to deductions that allow wealth-building
because of the money homeowners save, as opposed to paying taxes when
they lack the benefit of deductions or exclusions. 29
The government has long prioritized homeownership-related tax
policy. Subsequent to strong federal legislative reform in the 1930s, the
government further substantiated the social good of homeownership by
estate area with passage of the federal legislation and creation of federal agencies to implement the
new laws to get the economy and citizens back in better financial positions. Id.
26. Id.
27. The severity of the Great Recession and its ongoing fallout, importantly including its
influence on public opinion, has heightened the focus on the challenge of avoiding another such crisis.
See Fischer, supra note 5.
28. For example, communities rebuild with homeowners who can afford the property, creating
a stronger real estate tax base for local governments that the federal government has been aiding
through funds delivered to depressed state governments. School districts, local safety services, and
other local services have funding to support their communities. The social benefits of being in a stable
community affect the morale of those who live in it. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen
Virtues of Ownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 891 n.4 (2011). The individual perceived benefits
derived from homeownership pour over into the local economy, which could better thrive without
federal government assistance. Id. In addition, homeownership provides a sense of social status and
financial stability, from living in better neighborhoods with other homeowners and from steady
inclines in property values that create equity wealth. Id.
29. Understanding America’s Homeownership Gaps: 2003 Fannie Mae National Housing
MAE
5
(2004),
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/
Survey,
FANNIE
research/housingsurvey/pdf/survey2003.pdf (finding that 46% of the respondents to a survey
perceived a tax benefit of homeownership, and 84% perceived that buying a home was a good
investment). See Calvin Johnson, The Taxation of the Really Big House, 122 TAX NOTES 915 (2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520767.
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implementing social policy through tax law reform that allowed tax
deductions or exclusions under the tax code to taxpayers who owned
homes. First, the qualified residence interest deduction (QRID) lowered
the adjusted gross income upon which tax liability is determined. 30 The
QRID allows a yearly deduction for all mortgage interest taxpayers pay to
lenders over the entirety of the mortgage term. 31 As the second largest tax
deduction under the tax code, second only to the employer-provided
health insurance premium deduction, the QRID substantially reduces
citizens’ tax obligations. 32 Second, mortgage insurance premiums (MIP)
homeowners pay to lenders are allowable deductions so long as lenders
charge MIP on the mortgage loan.33 Third, real property taxes are also
deductible each year of the mortgage. 34 Fourth, there is a deduction for
first-time buyers for certain costs incurred at the time of purchase, but
people may qualify as a first-time buyer several times over their lives and
take the deductions. 35 Fifth, even more beneficial than the QRID and the
three other deductions mentioned is the exclusion from taxable income for
homeowners who sell their principal residences under § 121.
Under § 121, the gain from the sale of a principal residence is
excluded from taxable income, so taxpayers pay no taxes at all and pocket
the income, up to $250,000 or $500,000. 36 This exclusion is allowable
30. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). See Roberta F.
Mann, Housing and the Mortgage Interest Deduction (2012), www.ssrn.com/abstract=2189873.
31. Mann, supra note 30. Homeowners pay more in interest during the first half of the
mortgage term than the latter, creating significant deductions. For example, a monthly payment on
$100,000 mortgage with an interest rate of 5% over a 30-year term yields a monthly mortgage
payment of $536.82, excluding any escrows for taxes and insurances. Of that monthly payment, about
$416.67 is interest and $120.15 is applied to reduce the principal balance.
32. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
33. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(E). This section covers Mortgage Insurance Premiums. Lenders
typically charge MIP if the loan to property value ratio is less than 80%.
34. I.R.C. § 164 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). In 2008 and 2009, even
homeowners who did not itemize deductions could deduct real property taxes, by means of a special
add-on to the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(c)(1) (LEXIS, through PL 114-152, approved 5/9/16)
added Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3012.
35. I.R.C. § 36 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). The credit evolved over
time. First, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 established a $7,500 credit that must be
repaid in equal installments over 15 years. Second, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 established an $8,000 credit with no requirement of repayment unless the house was no longer
the taxpayer’s principal residence within the next three years. Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, I.R.C. §§
1-5. The Worker, Homeownership and Business Assistance Act of 2009 continued the $8,000 credit
through 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 2984, I.R.C. § 3304 (2012). The buyer need not be a true
“first-time” homeowner, but, rather, the buyer must not have owned a home within the three-year
period before the purchase. I.R.C. § 36(c). This provision was added by Pub.L. No. 110-289, Div. C,
Title I, Subtitle B, § 3011(a), 122 Stat. 2888, and amended by Pub.L. No. 111-5, Div. B, Title I,
Subtitle A, Part I, §§ 1006(a)–(c), (d)(2), (e), 123 Stat. 316, 317.
36. I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). Since 1997, this law allows
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every five years. 37 In essence, the government, through the tax code,
allows a boondoggle, defined as “a project funded by the federal
government out of political favoritism that is of no real value to the
community or nation.” 38 It is individual taxpayers who benefit from § 121,
not the government or society. Thus, along with the public policy interest
in helping homeowners recover from the financial crisis caused by
government deregulation of the banking industry, § 121 allows the
government the most reasonable justification for why homeowners with
underwater properties should not be taxed at all for forgiven indebtedness
resulting from MSSTs—it is shadow income at best, from which
taxpayers see no tangible gain like under § 121.
By enacting Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act and promoting
programs 39 to aid distressed homeowners, the government created a
societal perception 40 that new programs and homeownership tax laws
would protect the welfare of its citizens in a time of crisis. 41 The aftermath
of the 2007 financial crisis will continue for many years to come,
devastating the long-recognized social benefits of homeownership.
MSSTs, as thus far permitted, jeopardize any wealth-building many
taxpayers could realize or derive from homeownership-related tax
deductions because the new tax liability MSSTs create jeopardizes their
financial stability and impedes recovery. The government, therefore, must
expand MFDRA coverage as a matter of public policy to provide a
mechanism to protect the financial well-being of its citizens from the
societal malady caused by the 2007 financial crisis, and, arguably, caused
in part by the government’s action of misleading its citizens into
homeownership. 42
one who sells a principal residence to exclude up to $500,000 (if married) and $250,000 (for
individuals) of gain from their taxable income.
37. Id.
38. Boondongle, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/boondoggle (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016).
39. See Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative Program: Overview, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/foreclosure_alternatives.jsp (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016) [hereinafter HAFA].
40. In the early 2000s, the perception the federal government and lenders created was that
homeownership provides useful societal benefits, such as creating a “secure America.” Mann, supra
note 30, at 3, n. 1 (citing George W. Bush, President Calls for Expanding Opportunities for Home
Ownership, Remarks by the President on Home Ownership, St. Paul A.M.E. Church, Atlanta, Georgia
(June
17,
2002,
11:10
AM),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020617-2.html).
41. Mann, supra note 30. See also Stern, supra note 28, at 891. With homeownership, one
could build wealth, improve educational outcomes for children, and participate in local government
through voting and paying taxes. Id.
42. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 495.
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Some researchers argue that a change in the tax code is particularly
salient because they discredit prevailing notions of societal and personal
benefit of homeownership. 43 Some state that homeownership hinders
employment mobility 44 or creates financial hardship on those who cannot
afford associated maintenance costs. 45 If the government, therefore, was
complicit in promoting homeownership, which has now caused detriment
to its citizens, then the government should arguably do all it can to remedy
the ill it has helped create.
The practicality is that the impact of the 2007 financial crisis
continues to impede homeowners severely. 46 While Congress may be
unable to fix all the consequences resulting from homeownership and this
financial crisis, such as the underwater property market or the impact on
local and state government, it can take action through homeownership tax
law reform to remedy the adverse consequences the tax code places on
homeowners in today’s real estate market.
It is fundamentally unfair, given the current condition of the real
estate market, 47 for the government to burden its citizens with tax liability
through MSSTs. 48 The government’s obligation is to provide an equitable
means to allow homeowners who have not been able to recover from the
43. See generally Andrew J. Oswald, The Housing Market and Unemployment: A NonTechnical Paper (1999), http://www.andrewoswald.com/docs/homesnt.pdf.
44. Id. See Daniel N. Shaviro, The 2008 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform
22, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014) (noting it is more costly to move as
a homeowner than a renter, possibly slowing economic adjustment when jobs disappear in one area
and arise in another area); see also Richard Florida, How the Crash will Reshape America, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-willreshape-america/7293/6 (Noting homeownership makes the individual, and ultimately the society,
less nimble, especially when labor markets are shifting within regions, and also creates a stagnant
economy). Employment mobility is hindered because the need to sell an underwater home, or any
home, makes it difficult to take jobs in other locations, fostering a mismatch between workers’ skills
and available jobs when the local employment market tightens. Oswald, supra note 43.
45. In addition to the monthly mortgage payment that could increase, homeowners facing
financial hardship also must pay the rising costs of municipal taxes, such as real estate taxes, and
maintenance of the property. See generally Fischer, supra note 5 (stating the main goals in the United
States are those of the dual mandate: maximum employment and stable prices). For those homeowners
who had just enough financial ability to pay the increased mortgage payment, they were left with little
funds or no funds for other home-related costs, such as upkeep of the property or increases in local
real estate taxes. See Oswald, supra note 43.
46. Robert R. Callis & Melissa Kresin, Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Third
Quarter 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.census.gov/
housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
47. Financial crisis, and ultimately the real estate market collapse, was birthed from the
government’s lack of regulation of mortgage lending practices. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2.
48. Mortgage lenders failed to restrain themselves from introducing toxic mortgage products
into the market, for which they were profit motivated, that ultimately stripped equity wealth from a
vast number of citizens. See id.
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continuing financial crisis to eliminate tax liability resulting from MSSTs
by modifying the tax code. The government “owes to everyone an avenue
to possess himself a portion of the [nation’s wealth] sufficient for his
needs, through his own work . . . ,” and taxation of MSSTs denies that
avenue to too many current homeowners. 49 The equity wealth that
millions of citizens lost, and continue to lose, resulted from the conduct,
or lack thereof, of both the government regulators and self-regulating
mortgage lenders. 50 Homeowners should not suffer even more financial
loss by virtue of an antiquated tax code when the drafters of MFDRA
failed to foresee resulting consequences to homeowners who would be
further crippled economically by selling underwater properties. 51 MSSTs
are likely to remain a permanent, necessary feature of the marketplace in
many cities for quite some time into the future, especially given the
millions of underwater properties that exist nine years after the 2007
financial collapse. The government, therefore, must implement a longterm solution to avoid disproportionally burdening lower and middle-class
taxpayers with further financial hardship caused by tax liability to the
government.
III. THE RISE OF MORTGAGE SHORT SALE TRANSACTIONS
The concept of MSSTs evolved in the residential real estate market
in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, which caused home values to
plummet. Prior to that time, American homeowners were scarcely aware
of the existence of MSSTs because the housing market generally
maintained its values over the previous decades or saw less volatile
declines than were seen during the Great Recession. Housing values that
are underwater, or upside down, are also referred to as having negative
equity value, a concept used to refer to assets that are worth less than the
liability secured against the property. 52 Some data exists regarding

49. FORBATH, supra note 23, at 29 (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the
Renomination for the Presidency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (June 27, 1936), in 5 PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 234 (Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., 1938)).
50. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2.
51. See infra notes 80-92, and accompanying text.
52. As the leading global property information, analytics and data-enabled solutions provider,
CoreLogic delivers unique property-level insights that power the global real estate economy
company. See generally CORELOGIC, Negative Equity Report, http://www.corelogic.com/aboutus/researchtrends/equity-report.aspx#.VIxsLMJ0xOw (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). It produces a
Negative Equity Report every quarter but appears not to have started doing so until after the financial
crisis. Id. This report evidences the practical need to capture regularly these losses due to the
significant devaluation of property after the 2007 financial crisis. Id. The Equity Report provides a
quarterly overview of the distribution of equity across all U.S. single-family residential properties
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negative equity real property values that lenders rely on to negotiate the
terms upon which homeowners can sell their underwater homes through
MSSTs.
In the residential real estate mortgage context, the concept of the
“short sale,” referred to here as MSST, does not have clear origins in
scholastic literature, legal treatises, or tax laws prior to the 2007 financial
crisis. 53 According to at least one treatise, MSSTs are (private) two-party
contractual transactions between lenders and their borrowers in which
lenders allow borrowers 54 to pay a reduced mortgage balance, typically
based upon the current market value of the real property and what thirdparty buyers are willing to pay to buy the property. 55 For MSSTs, the
property values are always worth less than the existing mortgage balances
owed to lenders at the time the real estate sale transaction closes. 56
Lenders and homeowners negotiate MSSTs as arms-length transactions,
but lenders are in the superior bargaining position 57 because homeowners’
ability to sell underwater properties is subject to lenders’ sole discretion
to accept reduced payoffs of mortgages. Thus, when lenders accept the
reduced mortgage payoff, they agree to release their mortgage lien so that
homeowners can sell the property free and clear to buyers.
Under the MSST agreement, homeowners sell the underwater
with a mortgage. Id. In addition to the comprehensive national snapshot, the report includes details
for all states and the 25 largest metropolitan areas. Id. It is relied on by reputable financial and wealth
medias, such as Forbes. See Carlyle, supra note 4.
53. See MADISON, ET AL., supra note 8.
54. Buyers of the property are not a part of MSSTs agreement—only the real estate transaction
between homeowners/sellers of the property. Buyers typically enter into the real estate sale contract
on the condition that the deal will only be consummated if sellers can successfully obtain lenders’
approval for MSSTs. See generally Stacey Vernallis, Short Sales: Full Disclosure Needed,
REALTORMAG (Mar. 2010), http://realtormag.realtor.org/law-and-ethics/law/article/2010/03/shortsales-full-disclosure-needed; see California Association of Realtors, Short Sale Addendum (Nov.
2010), http://www.car.org/media/pdf/legal/standard-forms/478214/.
55. In the author’s experience, the MSST agreements with lenders release borrowers from any
further payment obligation in some cases, but in other instances, lenders may ask borrowers to agree
to an unsecured loan by signing a promissory note for all or a portion of the loan balance that cannot
be satisfied from the sales of the property.
56. MSSTs are governed by contract law and state legislation. See generally MICHELLE KIRBY,
OLR RESEARCH REPORT, 2013-R-0400, SHORT SALES (2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013R-0400.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2014) (discussing various states that are considering legislation
regulating [residential] short sales transactions). The federal government has only provided guidelines
for MSSTs under various loan modification programs. Id. See also HAFA, supra note 39.
57. Typically, homeowners pay off their mortgages upon the sale of their homes through the
proceeds at closing. At that time, lenders release the mortgage lien against the property, and the new
buyer has clear title. When the sales proceeds are insufficient to pay off the mortgage balance, the
risk is that the lender will not release the lien and no buyers or their purchase money mortgage lenders
will want to take title to the property subject to a superior lien position. See generally Michael
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 253 (2009).
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properties at the deflated current values that buyers in the market are
willing to pay for the property. At the closing, homeowners use the sales
proceeds from the real estate sales transaction to pay off the mortgage
balance. Lenders specifically instruct the escrow company as to the
conditions of the mortgage payoff, through instructions delivered to the
escrow company, so that lenders also release the mortgage lien on the
property upon payoff of the mortgage. If lenders do not agree to MSSTs,
the real estate sales transactions cannot occur unless homeowners can
afford to pay lenders the difference between the outstanding mortgage
balance and the sales proceeds at the time of closing of the real estate
transaction, which is a highly unlikely situation for financially distressed
homeowners with underwater property. But once the closing concludes,
the lender releases the mortgage lien and the homeowner is emancipated
from mortgage and associated costs of homeownership.
MSSTs are, arguably, beneficial to both lenders and borrowers.
Some of the benefits of MSSTs for lenders and homeowners are tangible.
For lenders, MSSTs aid them in receiving a substantial amount of the
mortgage balance that they might not otherwise receive if homeowners
default on their mortgages by not making monthly payments. 58
Homeowners benefit from being able to sell their underwater property in
times of financial distress. However, the financial benefit of MSSTs is
actual for lenders but illusory for homeowners because homeowners may
end up substituting the payment of a tax liability for the mortgage
payment. Given the federal tax consequences of the MSST that exists
under current tax laws, the mortgage balance lenders forgive to allow
MSSTs is treated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), under the tax
code, as taxable income to homeowners.
Homeowners with underwater properties are at a disadvantage
because they do not know all of the alternatives to MSSTs and, thus,
cannot weigh the benefits and disadvantages of each scenario as applied
to their specific financial situation. In particular, they do not know that the
existing tax law may not be favorable to them when selecting MSSTs.
Although Congress twice renewed MFDRA, broadening the scope of its
coverage would help millions of homeowners with underwater properties
to receive relief the government promised and would eliminate the
onerous tax consequences of the existing law, an inequity that the
government must remedy.
Subpart A analyzes the perceived, but illusory, benefits of MSSTs
for homeowners, and contrasts the perceived benefits with the actual
58.
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pitfalls of MSSTs, while discussing the tangible monetary benefits of
MSSTs for Realtors and lenders. Subpart B highlights the disadvantages
to homeowners when dealing with Realtors and lenders who are
knowledgeable about the intricacies of MSSTs. Subpart C demonstrates
the harsh implications of MSSTs for homeowners and suggests the
alternatives of bankruptcy and foreclosure actions. Subpart D discusses
the alternatives available to homeowners, specifically bankruptcy and
foreclosure. Subpart E advocates that finding a solution to the MSST
problem would boost the national economy.
A. Tangible Benefits of MSSTs for Realtors and Lenders Versus Illusory
Benefits for Homeowners
The post-2007 financial crisis has forced lenders and Realtors to find
ways to minimize their respective profit and losses in the sea of
underwater properties that has surged into the residential real estate
market. As a mechanism to aid the real estate sales market recovery and
to mitigate losses to lenders, MSSTs solved the problem of selling
devalued properties after the 2007 financial collapse. Lenders and
Realtors cooperated to assist homeowners in selling underwater properties
they could no longer afford through the use of MSSTs, and this seemed
like the ultimate solution for lenders, Realtors, and homeowners. The
motivations of the lenders and Realtors, however, were adverse to those
of homeowners who could have sought other alternatives to MSSTs such
as bankruptcy or foreclosure.
For Realtors, using MSSTs presented a solution to the problem of a
stagnant housing market with volumes of underwater properties, making
it easier for homeowners to sell, and Realtors to maintain revenue streams
through commissions. Lenders used MSSTs to avoid the costs and
liabilities of the foreclosure process and subsequent ownership of
properties. 59 Lenders are not in the business of owning property,
59. Lenders used short sales to trade a slow moving or greatly depreciated asset, in this case a
mortgage loan, for liquidity. Nelse Thompson Miller, Short Sales Overview with an Emphasis on
Broker Issues Until the Market Improves, More Property Owners Will Cut Their Losses and Move
On, PRACT. REAL EST. LAW 9 (2010). Lenders do not want to carry too many properties on their REO
(real estate-owned) books because they are not income-producing without monthly mortgage
payments. Short Sale, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosureprevention/short-sale-to-stop-foreclosure/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2014). See generally REO and BankOwned Properties: What You Need to Know, MY HOME BY FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/homeownership/rent_or_buy/reo_bank_owned.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2014). Real Estate Owned by Lenders is also referred to as REO Property. Id. Now the bank is
the owner, and it has a different liability than it ever did as a lender. See generally Roberto Ceniceros,
Foreclosures Create New Risks for Banks, BUSINESS INSURANCE (May 31, 2009),
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especially underwater property that creates more liability risk than profit
potential. 60 Homeowners who sought to avoid default or relocate to other
areas due to their personal financial crisis, such as income reduction or
job loss, needed MSSTs to sell their homes to cut their financial losses. 61
While at first glance, the use of MSSTs seemed mutually beneficial to
lenders, Realtors, homeowners, and, ultimately, the national economy that
was in desperate need of recovery, homeowners received the least
beneficial impact from MSSTs due to the federal tax liability created by
MSSTs that neither lenders nor Realtors experienced.
Lenders led the way to the real estate sales market recovery by
approving MSSTs, which Realtors used to move the unprecedented
number of underwater properties off the market. Motivated Realtors and
lenders worked in tandem to sell underwater properties. In promoting the
use of MSSTs to homeowners as a less detrimental option than
foreclosure, lenders and Realtors disregarded the detrimental tax and
consequential financial implications that homeowners face by entering
into MSSTs. In addition to the potential tax liability, homeowners face the
following: (a) negative credit reports; (b) the financial burden of upfront
fees some lenders require before they approve MSSTs; (c) the costs of
necessary repairs homeowners cannot afford to pay (either required by
buyers or municipalities before the sale of the property); (d) significant
loss of equity; and (e) potential other burdensome financial consequences.
The real estate sales industry’s consequences for engaging in MSSTs
were not grave at all by comparison to homeowners. Realtors were not
parties to the actual MSSTs, although necessary for its success, because
some lenders required homeowners to first attempt to sell the underwater
property through a Realtor for a specified period, such as three to six
months, before lenders would even consider MSSTs. Lenders agreed to
pay Realtors their commissions once the real estate sales transaction
closed. Thus, by listing the property, Realtors were able to provide market
value comparisons, or “comps,” of the property compared to other sales
in the market that lenders relied on when setting MSST mortgage payoff
amounts. After the period for listing the property expired and by the time
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20090531/ISSUE01/305319984; see also Patrick Barnard,
Property Preservation, Longer Foreclosure Timelines Drive Demand for REO Insurance, SERVICING
MANAGEMENT (Dec. 2013), http://www.mortgageorb.com/issues/SVM1312/FEAT_05_LongerForeclosure-Timelines-Driving-Demand-For-REO-Insurance.html.
60. See Miller, supra note 59.
61. See generally Michael Babbitt, Erik Gerth & Mary McGrane, Workout of Home Mortgage
Default, in 1 LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 3B:8 (Thompson Reuters 2014). From the
perspective of homeowners, MSSTs avoid foreclosures and deficiency judgments, allowing them a
fresh start without any continuing obligation to repay the loan under the note and mortgage. Id.
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homeowners had missed several payments, 62 lenders either began
negotiations of MSST payoff amounts based on the existing value of the
property, or waited until the homeowners actually entered into a real estate
sales contract with a buyer, with the contract closing being conditioned on
lender approval of an MSST. Homeowners and buyers then waited until
lenders processed the homeowner’s information for the MSST, including
income, financial statements, the real estate contract, Realtor comps, and
any other information lenders deemed necessary in their assessment as to
whether an MSST was in the lender’s best interest. Remember that
Realtors and buyers are not involved in the actual MSSTs negotiations,
only homeowners and lenders. Thus, if the real estate deal falls through
because lenders do not approve MSSTs, buyers do not suffer any damages
because of the conditional contract and Realtors do not have any loss
except the potential commissions (typically, commissions are not
guaranteed payments under the real estate sales contract by either sellers
or buyers until all contract conditions are met allowing the transaction to
close). Homeowners, however, face adverse consequences if their need to
sell the property is necessary for their financial viability.
Realtors’ motivations to make a commission would have outweighed
the need for homeowners to consider other viable alternatives, including
bankruptcy or foreclosure—possible acceptable options that might have
been more beneficial for homeowners to consider in lieu of an MSST. 63
Either foreclosure or bankruptcy might have had a less detrimental
financial impact than the federal tax liability created by an MSST.
Another possible benefit for homeowners choosing to allow foreclosure
on the property would be anti-deficiency judgment statutes in a minority
of states. Anti-deficiency judgment statutes forbid lenders from collecting
deficiency judgments against homeowners in the event of foreclosure
without tax consequences. For states without anti-deficiency judgment
statutes, when foreclosures are coupled with bankruptcy, homeowners in
bankruptcy avoid deficiency judgments because once the foreclosure
court enters the deficiency judgment, the lender becomes an unsecured
creditor, and that unsecured debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy court. 64
Under these circumstances, homeowners would still have negative credit
ratings for choosing an MSST, foreclosure, or bankruptcy, but MSSTs
have lingering financial effects because of the tax liability. Given the
62. Miller, supra note 59. “Lenders usually require the seller [homeowner] be in arrears on
payments for a few months before considering a short sale.” Id.
63. See supra Part II.A
64. See generally Using Bankruptcy to Provide Relief From Tax Debt, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE (2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013_NTF_Bankruptcy_Relief.pdf.
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complexities of the laws, both non-tax and tax-related, and the
information asymmetry between lenders, Realtors and homeowners,
homeowners were at a disadvantage by not knowing the best alternatives
to sell their underwater property, and more importantly, the implications
that advantaged and disadvantaged them. 65
Lenders were motivated to use MSSTs, not to make profits, like
commissions, but to avoid additional losses on the mortgages they held.
Lenders maximized the profits for investors by securitizing mortgages. 66
To minimize the losses on defaulted mortgages across various high-risk
tranches in these securities, known as mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs), lenders used MSSTs in lieu of foreclosures. In many instances,
foreclosure was a more costly and time consuming mechanism for
minimizing loss of profits for investors. Furthermore, lenders and
investors who held MBSs potentially faced significant losses from
uncollectable toxic mortgage products with more risk of borrowers
defaulting. MSSTs could help to mitigate those losses and avoid liabilities
associated with defaulted mortgages in at least three areas. 67
The first liability area relates to the defaulting toxic mortgage
products lenders placed in the real estate lending market and includes the
costs or liabilities 68 associated with the foreclosure process. 69 In judicial
foreclosure jurisdictions, 70 lenders did not want to initiate judicial
foreclosure actions, 71 especially with the significant costs associated with
litigation and the strict procedural rules that prolonged the foreclosure

65. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual
Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 660-62 (2009).
66. See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Post-Crisis
Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1306-07 (2010).
67. See ALVIN L. ARNOLD, MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES REPORT (2011). The
overall difficulty with MSSTs is that mortgage servicers of collateralized mortgage securities, often
referred to as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or mortgage backed securities (MBSs), need to
obtain approval for MSSTs from pools of investors, a process which has proved inefficient at best,
taking a few weeks to a couple of months. See generally Johnson, supra note 66.
68. Once lenders file for foreclosure and pay court costs and attorneys’ fees, lenders must then
secure the property if the property is vacant, maintain forced property and liability insurance on the
property, and pay or redeem any real estate taxes to avoid tax sales that could grant title to another
owner. See Miller, supra note 59, at 9-10 (Noting that short sales are more attractive and less
expensive than foreclosures). See generally ARNOLD, supra note 67.
69. ARNOLD, supra note 67.
70. In non-judicial foreclosure states, the delays may be less significant, but homeowners may
still be able to ask for court intervention. See Department of Consumer and Business Services, Where
to Get Help, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/foreclosure/Pages/where-to-get-help.aspx
(last visited May 17, 2016).
71. In non-judicial foreclosures, on the other hand, lenders have lower costs because no court
action or delays are involved unless homeowners change the process. Id.
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process. 72 Lenders expended an average of 40% loss of the mortgage loan
balance when lenders foreclosed versus less than half that loss, at 19%,
through MSSTs. 73 MSSTs, alternatively, saved lenders money and time
by avoiding the mandatory, complex procedures associated with
foreclosures. With foreclosures, lenders face significant delays in gaining
court-ordered possession of the property even after a judicial foreclosure
sale, especially if borrowers engage in motion practice in court hearings
and in continuances that extend the time of the court proceedings to allow
homeowners additional time to continue to reside in the property until
finding somewhere to relocate. 74 In addition, as the new property owner
following foreclosure, lenders have to bear the liability and costs of
owning the property.
Thus, the second area of liability is the costs associated with the
responsibilities of property ownership once the foreclosure process is
final. Lenders are in the business of lending money to buy homes, not
owning homes themselves. 75 Once lenders become owners, the additional
costs post-foreclosure include: (a) holding the unpaid mortgage for which
no income will derive; 76 (b) purchasing property and liability insurance to
cover potential damage to the property and third parties; (c) paying local
72. Miller, supra note 59.
73. According to an analysis in 2008 by Clayton Holdings, Inc., a firm that tracks mortgage
loans for investors, for an MSST, lenders do not have to pay “carrying costs.” Id. If the lender were
to foreclose on the property instead of allowing an MSST, the lender incurs significant costs including
court filing fees, service of process costs, legal fees, foreclosure related costs (notice, auction, and
other fees), maintenance fees (when the property has been abandoned by the homeowner), insurance,
and real estate taxes. Id. Thus, if lenders cooperate and approve an MSST, they save money. Id.
74. In practice, courts allow pro se borrowers and borrowers with attorneys time to mediate
with lenders, which delays the foreclosure case. During the height of the foreclosure crisis, in some
jurisdictions, court dockets were so overwhelmed with foreclosure actions that courts set up mediation
programs to deal with the volume of cases. See Paul Jackson, Overwhelmed Illinois Court Postpones
WIRE
(Apr.
16,
2009),
Foreclosures
Until
September,
HOUSING
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/overwhelmed-illinois-court-postpones-foreclosures-untilseptember.
75. In addition, lenders could face liability exposures, in tort for injury to parties in the property
or from local government actions for maintenance, taxes, or securing the property. Lenders also must
keep sufficient capital reserves for the outstanding mortgage balance until it is paid-off. Lenders also
face maintenance costs and issues for vacant properties, especially in blight communities. When
selling a foreclosed property, lenders must be careful to waive all warranties upon contract or face a
breach with potential buyers. See Ilyce Glink & Samuel Tamkin, Short sales and deficiency
judgments: What you need to know, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-21/marketplace/sns-201212161100—tms—
realestmctnig-a20121221-20121221_1_mortgage-lender-short-sale-forgiven-debt.
76. From my practical experience, lenders are typically the only buyer at the foreclosure sale
of the property and, thus, buy the property for the value of their own mortgage balance. In better real
estate markets, the hope is that they can quickly resell the property for a profit or cut their losses from
holding the property until it sells.
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real estate taxes and assessments; and (d) assuring general maintenance of
the property to avoid deterioration of vacant property. Lenders do not
make money for their investors by holding properties that produce no
revenues while expending money to pay for the cost of ownership of
properties. MSSTs minimize the time during which lenders realize losses.
The third liability area involves lenders’ liability exposure as sellers
of the properties. After acquiring title to the property post-foreclosure,
lenders seek to resell properties as quickly as possible because of the costs
of ownership stated above. In addition, when lenders become sellers of
properties, they expose themselves to all the potential contractual
responsibilities that any seller of property assumes. While lenders
predominately require their prospective buyers to waive almost all
warranties and representations as a condition of the sale, lenders who are
owners cannot waive federal and state required laws, including disclosure
laws, and lenders may, thus, become liable for non-compliance or
violation of statutory requirements. MSSTs allow lenders to avoid this set
of potential liabilities associated with selling properties when existing
homeowners facilitate the sale of the property. 77 This allows lenders to
save money and to avoid contract-based liability issues. 78
The cooperation between lenders and borrowers through MSSTs
may allow for a quicker turnaround of the sale between homeowners and
prospective third-party buyers. In the best case, homeowners who stay in
the property also maintain the property so that the value does not drop
further due to deterioration of the property. Lenders benefit from a better
chance of having a substantial amount of its mortgage paid off if they
cooperate with homeowners who assist in the sale of the property, remain
in legal title, and occupy and maintain the property pending the sale.
Lenders, as legal title owners, who then must sell the property, run the risk
that prospective buyers may not close on the real estate contracts at all and
that the property remains vacant, subjecting lenders to further liability as
the owner of record, especially to municipalities who require the property
be safely maintained. 79
77. See generally Leigh Thompson, Do Mortgage Lenders Prefer to Do a Short Sale or a
Foreclosure?, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/mortgage-lenders-prefershort-sale-foreclosure-49815.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
78. Lender costs associated with MSSTs include internal administrative services or fees
already contracted with a mortgage servicing company for the additional service of facilitating the
MSST. See also Julie Schmit, Lenders Embrace More Short Sales, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-02-20-Short-sales-_ST_U.htm.
79. Jonathan Stempel, Lawsuit Accuses Wells Fargo of Biased Lending in Chicago Area,
REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-chicago-lawsuitidUSKCN0JC24020141129. See also BofA, Citi, Wells Fargo Accused Of Lending Discrimination In
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For lenders and Realtors, the actual benefits, or liability avoidance,
through MSSTs make these transactions less risky. For homeowners,
while tangible benefits seem to be the sale of the underwater property and
relief from paying the mortgage, the benefits have an illusory effect
because inequity arises for homeowners resulting from MSSTs from
which they might not so easily recover, specifically financial hardship
from federal tax consequences. Recognizing this inequity, Congress has
attempted to address it but only in a very narrow scope that still leaves
homeowners exposed to federal tax liability.
B. Inequity of the MSSTs
The public policies that the federal government adopts to protect
homeowners are essential for the future economic stability of the national
economy. 80 Policymakers must take into consideration ways to balance
inequities to citizens when new laws create a disparity among taxpayers
legitimately deserving relief, as has been the case with the MFRDA.
Following the 2007 financial crisis, the introduction into the real estate
sales market 81 of the MSST method of selling underwater properties
created financial risk for unsuspecting homeowners selling their
properties. This financial risk was the federal tax liability created for
homeowners who used MSSTs to sell their property. In 2007, without any
apparent opposition from lenders or Realtors who promoted the use of
MSSTs, 82 the U.S. Congress responded with legislation to provide
temporary tax relief for homeowners 83 who faced tax liability for

Miami Suit, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/19/miamiborrower-discrimination_n_4475985.html.
80. DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20. The strength of
American democracy lies in its social values, on the way they influence public choice, and how they
are reflected in public policies. Id.
81. See Valenza, supra note 9.
82. The lending industry had no true opposition to this type of government aid for taxpayers
primarily because the relief for taxpayers did not impact lenders’ ability to avoid or mitigate their
liabilities in the residential real estate market through the use of MSSTs. In fact, the new law helped
lenders increase the payoff of bad mortgages on their books. See generally Laurie Goodman & Ellen
Seidman, The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act Has Expired—Renewal Could Benefit Millions,
URBAN INSTITUTE: HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY 6 (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413025-Mortgage-Forgiveness-Debt-Relief-Act-HasExpired.pdf.
83. For example, short sales were virtually unknown in California prior to 2007. See Valenza,
supra note 9. See also BILL ANALYSIS, SENATE BILL 412, supra note 13, (As reported by the U.S.
Senate, according to the California Association of Realtors, there were approximately 110,000 short
sales in California during 2010, up from approximately 90,000 during 2009, a few thousand in 2008,
and a negligible amount in 2007.).
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engaging in MSSTs. 84
Congress passed the tax relief act known as the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (MFDRA). 85 The MFDRA was
intended to address the tax implications for homeowners of using the
MSST vehicle, but, as I detail in Part V below, the MFDRA was too
narrow in scope and application to provide significant relief to the range
of homeowners with underwater property. In Part V, I propose means by
which Congress can provide the necessary pragmatic relief to the full
range of homeowners. This section, however, will discuss the nature of
relief provided to homeowners under the MFDRA and will suggest that
Congress make the following changes: (1) extension of the amount of time
for relief to be afforded; (2) tax relief for secondary residences similar to
that for principal residences; and (3) better tax relief protection for
homeowners when they put a residence on the market.
Congress passed MFDRA to address the harm that would arise with
lenders’ widespread use of MSSTs. The intent was to allow homeowners
to sell their underwater homes with some tax relief. Under the tax laws
prior to MFDRA, for any forgiven debt by a creditor, the IRS classified
the forgiven debt as taxable income to the taxpayer. The reduction of debt
that lenders forgave to allow MSSTs, thus, caused a shadow increase in
taxable income for homeowners. Taxpayers included the forgiven
indebtedness as income in their Adjusted Gross Income, which was then
subject to tax under the taxpayers’ applicable tax rate. The forgiven
indebtedness, therefore, created an additional tax liability. 86 In 2007,
84. It was not long after the 2007 financial collapse that policymakers addressed this inequity
for taxpayers trying to sell their underwater properties. See Fact Sheet: The Mortgage Forgiveness
Debt Relief Act of 2007, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 20, 2007), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071220-6.html (citing President George W. Bush
on Sep. 1, 2007: “When your home is losing value and your family is under financial stress, the last
thing you need is to be hit with higher taxes. So I’m working with members of both parties to pass a
bill that will protect homeowners from having to pay taxes on cancelled mortgage debt.”). Id. Such
action by the U.S. Congress seemed apropos to aid homeowners drowning in the underwater real
estate market and, especially after Congress gave national banks that held mortgages a monumental
amount of funds to recover from the mortgage market collapse, through the Trouble Assets Relief
Program (TARP). See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 1303, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); Porter, Pawns for a Higher Greed, supra note 25.
85. I.R.C. § 108 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). The section, in its entirety,
includes: discharge of indebtedness exclusion from gross income for bankruptcy, insolvency,
qualified farm indebtedness, qualified real property indebtedness, and qualified principal residence
indebtedness before January 1, 2015. As of December 31, 2014, Congress extended MDFRA to apply
to taxpayers filing 2014 tax returns who sold a home between January 1, 2014, and December 31,
2014. See H.R. 3856 (113th): Homeowners Debt Relief Extension Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3856 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). In December 2015,
MDFRA was extended through the end of 2016. Ricci, supra note 3.
86. Lenders faced no such tax consequences because the tax laws for businesses, such as large
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when lenders were entering into MSSTs to allow homeowners to sell their
underwater properties, in extreme situations, lenders were forgiving
hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt under mortgages, creating a
potentially devastating tax burden for taxpayers. In addition to the
potential tax liability concern, property sales under the poor national
economic climate became stagnant, and the saturation of underwater
homes in the market, plus the mortgage-lending freeze, made it impossible
for taxpayers to sell their homes without lenders’ approval of MSSTs.
MFDRA’s terms, however, were too narrow and failed to account
for, and adjust to, the evolving landscape of underwater properties in the
real estate market. 87 The law was too narrow as to its coverage period, its
scope of eligible taxpayers, and its flexibility to changes in the real estate
market during the volatile recovery period long after the 2007 financial
collapse, during the Great Recession, and even nine years later. The
underwater properties in the real estate market did and still do require a
broader scope of MFDRA. During the years after MFDRA became
effective, a variety of scenarios for taxpayers with principal and secondary
residences morphed in a distressed residential real estate landscape.
First, Congress only intended MFDRA to be temporary tax relief for
homeowners who faced potential tax burdens for engaging in MSSTs.
MFDRA, originally applied to debt forgiven by lenders through MSSTs
in calendar years 2008 through 2010, but has now been extended three
times, with the most recent extension by President Barack Obama in
December 2015 for an additional year to cover tax year 2016. Given the
statistics in 2015, almost 10 million homes nationwide that are currently
underwater, Congress’s one-year extension will not have the impact of
protecting taxpayers in the long term given the continued fallout of the
financial crisis, 88 which will continue well beyond 2016.
Second, MFDRA failed to take into account owners of underwater
secondary residences. 89 MFDRA provides tax relief for only those
lenders, are uniquely different from those affecting individual taxpayers. For lenders, the reduction in
debt was a deduction as an ordinary business loss, or capital loss depending on the tax rules, that
created no taxable income event. As a result, the MSST created an inequity in which the government
could tax individual taxpayers but not lenders. See generally IRS, https://www.irs.gov (detailing
business and corporation tax rules).
87. See BILL ANALYSIS, SENATE BILL 412, supra note 13.
88. Florida, for example, has in excess of 1 million of those properties. Harwell, supra note 4;
Barringer, supra note 4.
89. During the mortgage boom, secondary home purchases increased at a significant rate,
although not at the ridiculous pace of primary homes purchases. See generally Ing-Haw Cheng, Sahil
Raina, & Wei Xiong, Wall Street and the Housing Bubble, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2797 (2014),
available at https://www.princeton.edu/~wxiong/papers/WallStreet.pdf (discussing Americans
investing in second and investment properties). The statistics are difficult to find for secondary homes
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taxpayers who sold or sell their principal residence properties through
MSSTs. MFDRA does not allow for tax relief for secondary homes.
Congress’s passage of MFDRA, however, should have taken into account
the unfairness in not offering broad enough tax relief to solvent middleclass taxpaying homeowners whom lenders and the tax laws incentivized
to invest in secondary residences. Millions of homeowners invested in
secondary homes during the mortgage boom because of favorable lending
standards. 90 New tax laws that deal with MSSTs should give taxpayers the
option of selecting MFRDA relief for either principal or secondary
residences, which would at least give taxpayers some flexibility in how to
best mitigate the financial distress from owning these types of underwater
properties. Even though a secondary home, as defined by tax law, is only
occupied by the homeowner for finite periods during the year, the existing
tax laws have always given both principal and secondary homes the same
treatment for tax deduction purposes. The tax code provides the exact
same tax treatment for secondary homes as principal residences for
mortgage interest and real estate tax deductions. 91 Even though both
principal and secondary homes suffered staggering devaluation, 92 only
homeowners with principal residences could sell their properties through
MSSTs and exclude the debt that lenders forgave from their taxable
income. 93 With the exclusion limitations under MFDRA as to the amount
of forgiven debt taxpayers could exclude from taxable income, 94
sales, especially those sold as MSSTs, but the market for these homes existed from 2000 to 2007,
well before the financial crisis.
90. Many homeowners entered the secondary residence market, especially with available
mortgages lenders provided and with the ability to deduct the interest and real estate taxes just as they
did for their mortgages on their primary residences. Thus, the secondary home market grew with the
hope of many existing homeowners of having retirement homes in warmer climates or an investment
for future inheritance or use. Daria Kelly Uhlig, The Advantages & Disadvantages of Buying a Second
Home, SFGATE: HOME GUIDES, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/advantages-disadvantages-buyingsecond-home-50334.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). See also Why Have a Second Home?, DISCOVER
(Jul. 26, 2014), https://www.discover.com/home-loans/blog/why-have-a-second-home.
91. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
92. There is scarce data or information in the market for second homes but several warmer
region states are notorious for second home purchases including Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and
Southern California.
93. In a normal market where property values exceed mortgage balances, § 121 of the Tax
Code would allow homeowners to exclude gains from the sale of primary residences up to $250,000
for single taxpayers and $500,000 for married taxpayers. I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115,
approved 12/28/15). The same is not true for the sale of secondary residences. Id.
94. The federal exclusion applies to qualified principal residence indebtedness with a $2
million limit ($1 million for a married taxpayer filing a separate return). I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS,
through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). Some states promulgated tax laws that mirrored MDFRA.
Now passed into law, Assembly Bill 1393, introduced by Henry Perea, D-Fresno, amends California’s
tax code so that homeowners do not have to report as income certain debt that was canceled or

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2
2 - PORTER MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

840

AKRON LAW REVIEW

8/11/2016 12:32 PM

[49:813

classification of the property as principal or secondary should not be the
deciding factor. Instead, Congress should allow those homeowners to
choose the MSST property to which they will apply the tax relief. The
impact on potential lost tax revenues for the government would not be
affected by their choice, but the option would have a significant impact in
allowing a broader scope of homeowners with underwater property to
improve their financial positions, especially those whose only option is to
use MSSTs to sell those underwater properties.
Third, MFDRA is inflexible to changes in the real estate market
landscape for taxpayers who owned underwater property that they
originally may have classified as their principal residence, but, due to
personal economic circumstances and the stagnancy in real estate market,
the property no longer qualifies as a principal residence under the IRS
occupancy rules for tax purpose. Homeowners who move out of the
property or rent it to mitigate their financial losses could find themselves
not qualifying for MFDRA tax relief if they ultimately sell the property
through MSSTs. Many homeowners are forced to vacate properties they
cannot sell due to volatile market conditions, which forced them to leave
their properties to relocate for better job opportunities, 95 or because of
economic distress from income reduction or job loss. 96 To mitigate the
financial distress or avoid defaulting on their mortgage loans,
homeowners rented principal residences until the market recovered so
they either could sell the homes under better property value conditions or
stabilize their financial distress to be able to afford living in the residence
again. 97 Under MFDRA, once the home is no longer one’s principal
forgiven by a lender due to principal reduction from a loan modification. See Evan Nemeroff, Calif.
Law Covers Lapse in Mortgage Forgiveness Tax Protection, NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS (Jul. 22,
2014), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/regulation/calif-law-covers-lapse-in-mortgageforgiveness-tax-protection-1042192-1.html.
95. See generally Christopher J. Goodman & Steven M. Mance, Employment loss and the
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS (2011),
2007-09
Recession:
An
Overview,
BUREAU
http://www.bls.gov/mlr/2011/04/art1full.pdf.
96. The financial crisis also affected ancillary industries that collapsed due to the mortgage
crisis, bank closings, lenders downsizing staff, construction industry, real estate market professionals,
among other causes. See generally Amir Sufi & Atif Mian, Why the Housing Bubble Tanked the
Economy and the Tech Bubble Didn’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 12, 2014, 6:03 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-housing-bubble-tanked-the-economy-and-the-techbubble-didnt/.
97. This scenario distinguishes those investors who purchased property not to occupyy it but
for profit through flipping or rental and who designated such properties as business investments for
tax purposes. The risks taken by those investors are not the conservative risks anticipated by
borrowers who buy property for personal residences. Leonard Baron, Rental Property Investing 101—
BUSINESS,
(Apr.
23,
2012),
Tips
for
Future
Property
Moguls,
FOX
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/04/23/rental-property-investing-101-tips-for-
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residence, the law does not provide tax relief for MSSTs forgiven
indebtedness. Given homeowners’ inability to sell their homes in a
depressed real estate sales market, for several years in many cases, and
the need for economic recovery from their personal financial crisis in the
Great Recession, the law should extend protection to this class of
homeowners whose principal residence changed classification due to
market conditions after the financial crisis.
These circumstances justify policymakers modifying MFDRA, or
other existing tax laws, in order to address the gross inequities in tax relief
these homeowners face. Underwater homeowners and those who sold
underwater property through 2014, which property was not a qualified
principal residence, potentially face a rude awakening even with
Congress’s latest extension of the law. Congress has not provided broad
enough tax relief coverage of MFDRA for the various scenarios that are
ongoing many years after the financial crisis. These consequences were
reasonably foreseeable under MDFRA, especially as Congress was
considering the extensions of the law. If the objective of MFDRA was to
aid taxpayers, policymakers should have kept up with the changing
circumstances and should have modified the type of aid to fit what would
truly help homeowners in the existing real estate market. 98 The impact of
the qualified principal residence requirement could financially devastate
many American taxpayers who perceived that they escaped the burdens
of owning underwater property.
For the millions of American homeowners with underwater property,
the impact of the potential federal tax liability could result in a further
crisis of civic consciousness. 99 The government’s adoption of tax policies
to protect its citizen homeowners is essential for the future stability of the
national economy upon which all Americans thrive or perish. 100 Citizens
perceive that the government passed laws like MFDRA to aid them, not
harm them. When the law imposes further financial burden for citizens,
the resulting hardship perpetuates the lack of confidence Americans have
in our government’s ability to protect its citizens.

future-property-moguls/.
98. Significant property devaluation has plagued many communities but disproportionately
affects blacks, Latinos and other minority group communities. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2.
99. William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of Homeownership
After the Housing Crisis, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES (Aug. 2013),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/hbtl-04.pdf.
100. FCIC REPORT, supra note 2.
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C. The Implications of Alternatives to MSSTs
Financially distressed homeowners who own underwater properties
perceive MSSTs as a more favorable method to sell their homes than the
threat of forcibly losing their homes to foreclosure. Homeowners may
perceive that lenders created, in the MSST, an alternative process that
could help them out of the distressed property that they would otherwise
not be able to continue to afford or to incentivize the sale of an underwater
property that had been on the market for a long duration. However, the
neighborhoods of homeowners who remained in their underwater
properties, neighborhoods saturated with properties in foreclosure,
became less than desirable for homeowners and their families to continue
living in. 101 Whatever the reasons homeowners used MSSTs to sell their
homes, other than a sentence in a real estate contract, it is highly probable
that neither the lenders nor Realtors discussed the potential tax liabilities
associated with engaging in MSSTs. The government also fell short of
ensuring homeowners understood the consequences of not strictly
complying with provisions of MFDRA.
Homeowners perceived lenders who promoted governmentapproved programs as rescuers of distressed homeowners who owned
underwater properties because homeowners now could sell their homes or
modify their mortgage loans. This rescuer perception was misplaced.
Without understanding the tax and financial implications of engaging in
MSSTs, homeowners perceived that lenders’ approval of MSSTs allowed
them to voluntarily participate in the sale of the property, to vacate the
property on favorable terms, and to negotiate with lenders. This voluntary
participation appeared more favorable to homeowners than the distress of
a foreclosure action. 102 For homeowners, unfortunately, the motivations
of lenders and borrowers for engaging in MSSTs are incongruent. Even
though the ultimate goal of selling the property and paying off the
mortgage offers some benefits for both homeowners and lenders, the
implications of doing so are inequitably balanced against homeowners,
especially given the current tax law regime, best seen through an example,
such as the following:
A homeowner sells an underwater home with a current market value of
$100,000. The original property value was $150,000. The mortgage loan

101. Blighted communities resulted from mass foreclosures. See generally David Streitfeld,
Blight Moves in After Foreclosures, LA TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-vacant28aug28story.html#page=1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
102. Babbit, et al., supra note 61.
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balance at the time of the MSST is $120,000 (based on an original purchase price of $150,000 where the homeowner paid 20 percent, or
$30,000, as a down payment). 103 The lender must agree to approve the
MSST for at least $100,000, the price a willing buyer may pay given the
current market value of the property, but more likely would pay less or
shop for other properties where homeowners and their lenders are willing to negotiate for less than the current depressed market value. The
lender must forgive $20,000 of the $120,000 mortgage loan balance in
order for the homeowner to sell the property. In addition to the mortgage
payoff, the homeowner, however, has additional costs associated with
closing the real estate transaction, such as Realtor commissions and fees,
title/escrow company fees, local government fees and real estate taxes,
county recording fees, and other related transaction fees. If these costs
are an additional estimated $12,000, 104 the homeowners will need to
come up with the money to pay them at closing or the lender will have
to pay them and accept less than $100,000 of the sales price as the payoff. The latter is more likely because distressed homeowners are typically unable to come up with the money to pay off the additional costs
at closing. If the lender does not agree to pay the additional closing costs,
the MSST cannot occur under the lender’s terms. For homeowners unable to afford to continue paying the mortgage, the inability to sell the
property may possibly result in the lender filing a foreclosure action.

Given the significant financial loss lenders incur in foreclosures,
almost double the costs of MSSTs, 105 the lender would likely better
benefit by approving the MSST and accepting whatever sales proceeds
are available after closing. Thus, the lender will accept an amount taking
into account the additional costs, which the borrower cannot pay to
facilitate the closing. In this case, the homeowner walks away without
103. For this example, one needs to do amortization values for 7 years and with interest rate
calculated and resources on average devalued price of property in certain areas. See LOAN
AMORTIZATION TABLE CALCULATOR, http://www.amortizationtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
104. Seller’s costs that might not be paid by another source based on a $100,000 purchase price
include Realtor’s commission at as high as 7% in some jurisdictions ($7,000), unpaid real estate taxes
or back taxes if the homeowner has not paid them is estimated at 2.5% of the property value ($2,500),
title/escrow fees for owner’s policy and associated fees for certain title coverages, recording fees,
appraisals, government taxes or other liens, etc. ($1,000), and maintenance or repair related credits
seller is responsible for paying ($1,500).
105. Theoretically, at 40% of the $120,000 mortgage balance, the lender will pay 40% in costs
associated with a foreclosure, or $48,000, receiving only $52,000 ($120,000 - $20,000 - $48,000). At
19% in cost in an MSST, the lender will pay $22,800 in costs, receiving $77,200 ($120,000 - $20,000
- $22,800). If this example was an actual deal with only $20,000 underwater in the property value
versus the mortgage loan, then the lender receives $88,000 ($120,000 - $20,000 - $12,000). In either
MSST situation, the lender saves money by engaging in an MSST rather than pursing foreclosure,
both in finance terms and time saved. See LOAN AMORTIZATION TABLE CALCULATOR,
http://www.amortizationtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
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owing the lender, but tax consequences may arise because the lender has
forgiven $32,000 of the mortgage indebtedness, 106 resulting from the
MSST—$20,000 of the loan balance plus $12,000 to pay costs, and only
receiving $88,000 in proceeds from the sale to pay off the original
$120,000 mortgage balance. The homeowner experiences the benefit of
the sale of the property and is emancipated from paying the mortgage and
owing the lender, but the borrower may now face federal tax liability
based on $32,000 of taxable income, unless the law excludes the forgiven
loan balance from taxable income. MFDRA provided that exclusion only
for those homeowners who sold a qualified principal residence from 2007
to 2014. For homeowners with secondary residences, under the same
scenario, the forgiven indebtedness of $32,000 is treated as taxable
income. Lenders, overall, have greater benefit than homeowners in using
an MSST because borrowers/sellers do all the work to consummate the
real estate sales transaction, borrowers must deal with adverse tax
treatment or find ways to avoid it, and borrowers remain subject to all the
costs and liabilities associated with homeownership until the sale
concludes.
Millions of borrowers with underwater properties are unaware that
they have options for avoiding the tax liability and deficiency
judgments, 107 (1) by allowing foreclosure on the property; 108 (2) by
signing an unsecured, recourse note for the $32,000 and repaying the
lender the short amount from the sale over a period of years; 109 (3) by,
106. The $32,000 is calculated by deducting the $20,000 forgiven debt balance owed on the
original outstanding $120,000 mortgage balance (based on the $100,000 sale price), then deducting
$12,000 in seller related closing costs. Thus, the lender will only receive $88,000 ($120,000 $20,0000 - $12,000) of the outstanding loan under an MSST.
107. Anti-deficiency judgment legislation in some states evidences strong public policy against
placing the burden on consumers for loan products introduced into the market. The California
legislature’s primary purpose for passing its anti-deficiency judgment statute was to prevent the
overvaluation of property by placing the risk of inadequate security on lenders to discourage risky
lending practices and precarious land schemes. See Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1060-62 (Cal.
1972). California law also forbids consumers from waiving the anti-deficiency protections either at
the time the loan is made or in a forbearance agreement, such as through an MSST. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 580(b) (LEXIS, through Chapter 1 of the 2016 Session). See generally Jackson v. Taylor,
272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (1969); see also Thompson v. Allert, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 1466-67 (1991);
Palm v. Schilling, 199 Cal. App. 3d 63, 69 (1988).
108. In states without deficiency judgment statutes, the amount could be dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A § 727 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
109. Mortgage payment of $1500 then repayment of unsecured debt estimated at $650 for 5
years, under current laws. See generally Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. However, lenders
may be unwilling to enter into an unsecured debt with financially distressed borrowers who have an
inability to pay, and would prefer an MSST versus pursuing a more costly foreclosure process. The
MSST option does not have as significant of an impact on the borrower’s credit because borrowers
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under certain circumstances, negotiating with the lender for a deed in lieu
of foreclosure in full satisfaction of the mortgage amount; 110 or (4) by
filing bankruptcy. 111 The second and third options, however, are at the
lender’s discretion, much like MSSTs, and a lender would agree to them
only if the options provide more substantial benefit to the lender than an
MSST. The options allow homeowners to dispose of underwater principal
and secondary residences, or other underwater property as well. Although
homeowners suffer negative credit rating implications in all these
scenarios, just as with MSSTs, 112 borrowers can financially recover and,
importantly, avoid the significant financial burdens associated with tax
liability that could plague them for many years. This Article does not
mean to suggest that bankruptcy and foreclosure are uniformly available
or uniformly desirable. As I note in the next section, they are not.
Nevertheless, homeowners should have complete information regarding
each option for dealing with underwater properties.

can negotiate with lenders to report to credit agencies that the loan has been satisfied, as agreed.
MSSTs and foreclosure both have negative impact on credit reports, up to 7 years, and bankruptcy up
to 10 years. In either situation, borrowers incur time to recover financial without owing the IRS for
taxes and penalties, subject to onerous collection methods.
110. The deed in lieu (DIL) of foreclosure method is available from lenders and allows
homeowners to negotiate with lenders for the friendly surrender of the property, which prevents costly
foreclosure litigation, but few, if any, lenders ever use this option. DIL will not necessarily avoid tax
consequences unless lenders agree that the value of the property is worth less than the value of the
mortgage loan balance. In the author’s real estate practice, she only negotiated one successful DIL
transaction where the homeowners voluntarily relinquished the property and transferred title back to
the lender by deed without the lender negatively reporting the transaction on the homeowners’ credit
report. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1401 (2016) (Illinois is in the minority of states with
statutes dealing with DILs); see also Thompson v. Smith, 793 P.2d 449, 449, 451 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (finding that homeowners do not owe a deficiency judgment for DILs). Lenders generally do
not allow DILs if there is also a second mortgage or other liens, such as federal tax lien, against the
property.
111. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, taxpayers must qualify for the Income Means Test to be eligible
to file. Chapter 7 is for individuals who have no means to repay their debts under Chapter 13. Before
the law changed, there were fewer restrictions on eligibility for those who wished to wipe out credit
card debt, medical bills, and most personal loans through Chapter 7 bankruptcy, regardless of their
ability to repay their debts. For solvent taxpayers, they would need to liquidate all assets to pay any
debts or tax liens to qualify, which most people choose not to do in lieu of a tax lien. Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 101). With lenders as unsecured creditors, borrowers who fall into further financial
hardship may qualify for relief under bankruptcy laws that might allow them to discharge the debt.
112. The government, through the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) Program,
attempted to give additional options for lenders to avoid costly foreclosures and incentivized them to
enter into MSSTs or DILs with homeowners to avoid foreclosures. HAFA, supra note 39 (see link to
MHA Compensation Matrix, last updated Nov. 3, 2014, using taxpayer dollars to pay lenders for
successfully negotiating mortgage related transactions).
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D. Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Alternatives to MSSTs
There are few alternatives to MSSTs for homeowners who wish to
avoid a potential tax liability upon the sale of their homes. Moreover,
these alternatives might not readily be available for many middle-class
citizens because of the qualifications required for homeowners to take
advantage of them. A primary alternative to MSSTs is bankruptcy coupled
with foreclosure.
Bankruptcy 113 and foreclosure correlate. They are discussed together
because bankruptcy only stalls the foreclosure action in state court for a
period of time so the homeowners can negotiate the sale of the property
through MSSTs. 114 The federal bankruptcy laws do not permanently
prevent lenders from instituting a foreclosure action when a taxpayer files
for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy filing only invokes the automatic stay
provision under the Bankruptcy Code Section 365 temporarily because
secured creditors and lenders can lift the automatic stay with the
bankruptcy court’s permission and proceed with either a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure action. 115
Once lenders are no longer subject to the bankruptcy automatic stay,
lenders can pursue foreclosure in state court or negotiate possession of the
property with borrowers in lieu of a foreclosure action. In the case where
the homeowner wants to keep the property, lenders may negotiate a
repayment plan with borrowers, including reduction of principal balance,
or an extended term of the mortgage. However, any loan modification that
lenders allow, whether done while the taxpayer is subject to the
bankruptcy court or not, may create a taxable event for any reduction in
principal for cancellation of indebtedness, much like for MSSTs. The
bankruptcy court cannot require any modification of the loan between
debtors/borrowers and lenders for MSSTs or modifications.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy court
does not have jurisdiction to force lenders into a loan modification, 116 or
arguably MSSTs to sell the property. However, the deficiency judgment
lenders obtain against borrowers resulting from a foreclosure action

113. See supra note 111.
114. Lenders have a right to foreclosure under the terms of the mortgage and through state law.
See generally National Mortgage Law Summary, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MORTGAGE ATTORNEYS
(2013-14), https://www.acmaatty.org/resource/mls.cfm (listing foreclosure statutes for all 50 states).
115. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
116. Bankruptcy courts, to date, cannot renegotiate or force negotiation of mortgage terms for
borrowers. In a 1993 decision, Nobelman v. American Savings, the Supreme Court held that it was a
reasonable statutory interpretation of the legislative history of the law that debtors could not modify
even the unsecured portions of mortgages on a principal residence. 508 U.S. 324, 324 (1993).
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would be a dischargeable unsecured debt under bankruptcy laws,
especially in jurisdictions that do not have anti-deficiency judgment
statutes. 117 For tax purposes, there would be no taxable event by
combining bankruptcy and foreclosure because, once the foreclosure
action is final, the lenders’ unsecured judgments are not classified as
forgiven indebtedness and the cancellation of the debt through the
Bankruptcy Code is allowed for unsecured debts. Thus, the
taxpayer/debtor walks away with a fresh financial start, and, most
importantly, is not subject to a tax liability, unlike in MSSTs.
While bankruptcy may relieve the tax liability resulting from MSSTs
for some taxpayers, bankruptcy is not always a viable option. Under 11
U.S.C. § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, federal tax liens are dischargeable
debts in bankruptcy within three years of the filing date of the tax
return. 118 In essence, the IRS would have at least three years to pursue a
collection action for the tax liability, and if it does not take collection
action, the taxpayer can discharge the tax liability by filing bankruptcy.
However, if the IRS takes collection action, it stops the tolling of the threeyear period. For many taxpayers, filing for bankruptcy to avoid a tax
liability would not be prudent if the only reason for filing bankruptcy is to
avoid the tax liability. 119 Additionally, many taxpayers trying to get back
on their feet would not likely qualify for bankruptcy because of the strict
income requirements 120 that make filing almost impossible. Middle-class
taxpayers, for example, would suffer more harm to their financial health
and credit worthiness by filing bankruptcy to avoid tax consequences of
MSSTs than by Congress amending MFDRA to address the tax burden
created by MSSTs, at least during this ongoing time of crisis for
homeowners suffering from the underwater real estate property market. 121
E. The Relevance of MSSTs to National Economic Recovery
The housing market has not sufficiently stabilized, with home values
in many states still significantly below pre-2007 market values. The lack
117. Supra note 16.
118. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) (setting forth
exceptions to discharge). The IRS has no limitation period on collection if a tax return is never filed
and has seven years if the taxpayer commits fraud or understates income by 25%. Id.
119. Letter of Understanding, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, IRS, NO. 2013-0036 (Sept. 19, 2013),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/13-0036.pdf.
120. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
121. Arguably, the reckless conduct of financial institutions in the residential mortgage market,
which abused their duty of care to borrowers in the market, caused the harm to the overall economic
stability of the United States as well as taxpaying homeowners. See Porter, Pawns for the Higher
Greed, supra note 26 (citing FCIC REPORT, supra note 3).
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of economic wealth caused by the loss of home values has impeded the
growth of the national economy because millions of Americans are unable
to sell their homes at prices at which they can recover their equity wealth
for spending, investing, and saving.
In April 2014, housing data suggested that the spring selling season
was off to a slow start. A year-to-year decline in March 2014 homes sales
persisted in several markets, including Las Vegas, Phoenix, San Diego, 122
the Inland Empire of California, and many other urban communities. 123
The market conditions forced homeowners wishing to sell their
underwater homes to further reduce sale prices because of the saturation
of properties in the housing market. In some markets, the volume of
properties with reduced housing prices was shockingly dramatic, such as
in Phoenix, where 45% of the February 2014 listings cut sale prices,
compared to 32% in 2013. 124 The housing market remained slow going
into the last quarter of 2014. 125
The loss of home values and lack of economic wealth for
homeowners in many communities across the country impeded the growth
of the national economy in several ways. First, if borrowers had been able
to sell their homes for a price which allowed them to pay-off their
mortgage and potentially receive some of their paid-in or accrued equity,
they would have walked away with monies to save for future spending or
to invest in the other markets now that the national economy has survived
the Great Recession. 126 Second, depressed property values caused riskadverse lenders, who escaped the worst of the financial collapse, to be
resistant to future lending in the real estate market, as well as in non-real
122. According to DataQuick, a San Diego research company, quoted in the Wall Street Journal.
See Conor Dougherty & Nick Timiraos, Housing Market Slow to Hits Its Spring Stride, WALL STREET
(Apr.
16,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
JOURNAL
SB10001424052702303887804579503662947889776.
123. These areas are unfortunately predominately minority communities, hardest hit by property
devaluations. The eleven states with the highest number of hardest-hit ZIP codes are (in order):
Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, Missouri, California, Nevada, and
North Carolina. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
124. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2; Dougherty & Timiraos, supra note 122.
125. While there are statistics on foreclosure rates of properties across the country,
unfortunately, there are no such statistics on MSSTs because MSSTs are not a matter of public record
given the private nature of the transaction between lenders and borrowers.
126. As a result of the financial crisis in the United States, eight million jobs were lost, millions
of families lost their homes, trillions of dollars of wealth disappeared, and trillions of dollars of
economic production failed to occur. See John Irons & Isaac Shapiro, Regulation, Employment, and
the Economy: Fears of Job Loss are Overblown, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_and_the_economy_fears_of_job_loss_are_
overblown/. As is typically the case in the wake of a financial collapse, the recovery has been slow,
and the unemployment situation remains painful. Id.
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estate related lending, such as small business lending. 127 Third, new
homebuyers have become hesitant to enter, or re-enter, the real estate
market due to the ongoing volatility of home values. Finally, the potential
future tax liability the government may place on taxpayers who engaged,
or may engage, in MSSTs has created too great a risk of future economic
uncertainty for the taxpayers who are now forced to conservatively spend,
or who do not have money to spend. Thus, the underwater market has
resulted in significant financial instability and wealth loss for citizens, and
may be contributing to stagnancy of the national economy.
IV. CURRENT TAX LAW REGARDING FORGIVENESS OF INDEBTEDNESS
FOR MSSTS
Prior to and after Congress passed MFDRA, 128 the tax laws treat any
forgiveness of indebtedness as taxable income to taxpayers. 129 For tax
years 2007 through 2015, the IRS treats MSST cancellation of
indebtedness as an exclusion from taxable income, 130 but only for
“qualified principal residence indebtedness.” 131 The goal of adding the
MFDRA amendment to existing tax law was to provide tax relief on
canceled debt for “homeowners involved in the mortgage foreclosure
crisis currently affecting much of the United States.”132 The effect of the
financial crisis will last for an unpredictable time; thus, MFDRA should
have permanency in the tax laws with some modifications to the existing
law, using other existing tax law to support this modification, such as
Section I.R.C. § 121.
The MFDRA exclusion allows taxpayers to exclude up to $2,000,000
($1,000,000 if married filing separately) of canceled “qualified principal

127. For examples of small business lending that was affected or other lending lines that dried
up because of residential real estate mortgage lending problems, see Rebel A. Cole, How Did the
Financial Crisis Affect Small Business Lending in the United States?, SBA: OFFICE OF ADVOCACY
(Nov. 2012), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf.
128. See
Topic 431: Canceled
Debt:
Is it
Taxable or Not?, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc431.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
129. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) treats discharged
indebtedness as gross taxable income.
130. See MFDRA, supra note 85.
131. “Qualified” refers to the debt associated with the principal residence and includes the
purchase money mortgage and in some circumstance debt acquired from refinancing in which monies
were used to improve the property. See Publication 4681 (2015), Canceled Debts, Foreclosures,
Repossessions,
and
Abandonments
(for
Individuals),
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p4681/index.html#en_US_2015_publink100024646.
132. Cancelled Debt—Is It Taxable or Not? IRS TAX MAP 2014 (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://taxmap.ntis.gov/taxmap/archive2014/taxmap/taxtp/Tt400_14-025.htm (emphasis added).
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residence indebtedness.” 133 MFDRA created the amendment to section
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) by providing exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness
from gross income under limited circumstances. 134 Section 108 provides
as follows:
Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in
whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if—
...
(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent, 135
...
(E) the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness, which lenders have discharged before January 1, 2017. 136 [This
section (E) is the amendment to the tax law created by MFDRA].

The goal of MFDRA was laudable; however, the scope and resulting
impact of the law was ineffective in at least two significant respects, given
the financial conditions of homeowners and the deluge of underwater
properties that resulted from the 2007 market collapse. First, the
application of the solvency rules to middle-class taxpayers created an
ongoing inequitable impact for taxpayers who own underwater property,
whether principal or secondary, 137 and will last beyond year 2016.
Second, related to the contradictory treatment of debt cancellation as
taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12), the law should permanently
apply the same or similar policy for exclusion criteria as under I.R.C. §
121 (gains from the sale of a principal residence) because taxpayers who
realize actual profits from a sale have no tax liability but shadow income
from MSSTs is treated as a tax liability. If the law were to apply a forwardthinking policy, it would alleviate the need for Congress to consider a la
carte renewal of MFDRA until such time as the underwater real estate
market has recovered from the financial crisis.

133. See generally I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
134. I.R.C. § 108. The section, in its entirety, includes: discharge of indebtedness exclusion
from gross income for bankruptcy, insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, qualified real property
indebtedness, and qualified principal residence indebtedness before January 1, 2015.
135. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
136. MFDRA, supra note 85 (emphasis added).
137. While section 108(a)(1)(E) protected many homeowners of qualified principal residences
from tax liability for MSSTs, when Congress created and renewed MFDRA, it did not address the
narrow-sightedness of the law by only including principal residences.
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A. Inequitable Impact of Tax Law Solvency Rules
For MSSTs, the IRS treats the forgiveness of qualified principal
residence indebtedness as taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) but
MFDRA, codified as I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E), allows all taxpayers who are
solvent to exclude the forgiven indebtedness from taxable income, for tax
years 2008 through 2016. Without the exclusion under MFDRA, the
resulting effect on both insolvent and solvent homeowners who engage in
MSSTs is the creation of tax liability. The existing tax law, however,
provides for the exclusion of forgiven indebtedness for insolvent
taxpayers under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), with some restrictions, whether for
principal or secondary residences, that could even make insolvent
taxpayers subject to tax liability. Thus, truly insolvent taxpayers would
face no liability. However, any solvent middle-class homeowner (at any
level of solvency) and insolvent taxpayers for whom the forgiven
indebtedness does not exceed their level of insolvency both face
potentially severe tax liability; severe when compared to their actual
adjusted gross income. 138
For insolvent homeowners, § 108(a)(1)(B) applies, but the IRS rules
define who qualifies as an insolvent taxpayer. 139 As this section applies to
MSSTs that do not qualify as principal residences, if the debt the lender
forgives is equal to, but does not exceed, the taxpayer’s insolvency level,
then the IRS will not treat the forgiven indebtedness as taxable income.
However, to the extent the forgiven debt exceeds the taxpayer’s
insolvency level, the IRS generally treats that excess of forgiven
indebtedness as taxable income, subject the excess to tax liability. 140 The
following example provides a basic application of the tax rules, although
tax laws are never simple to understand, and only those who are astute
practitioners of tax law know how to apply the maximum savings for
individual taxpayers, taking into account the taxpayer’s overall financial
landscape:
Taking the amounts from the example in Section III(C), an insolvent
taxpayer may face two different outcomes. Under the first insolvency
scenario, if the taxpayer’s insolvency level is $32,000, and $32,000 is
the forgiven indebtedness resulting from the MSST, the IRS will allow
the taxpayer to exclude the entire $32,000 from taxable income, leaving
138. If a taxpayer has only $1.00 of net worth, the taxpayer is considered solvent. The
insolvency rule under § 108(a)(3) states as follows: “In the case of a discharge to which paragraph
(1)(B) applies, the amount excluded under paragraph (1)(B) shall not exceed the amount by which the
taxpayer is insolvent.” I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the insolvent taxpayer with no tax liability. However, the second insolvency scenario yields a different outcome, in that if the taxpayer’s insolvency level is only $20,000, and $32,000 is the forgiven indebtedness
resulting from the MSST, the IRS will only allow taxpayer to exclude
$20,000 from taxable income, but treat the remaining $12,000 of forgiven indebtedness as taxable income that would create a tax liability,
even though the taxpayer is still insolvent after the MSST. 141

Thus, insolvent taxpayers who sell underwater properties through
MSSTs are treated unequally based on the level of their insolvency—
applying harsher standards to those who have more indebtedness than to
other insolvent taxpayers. This latter scenario makes it almost impossible
for financially suffering taxpayers to recover from the impact of the
financial crisis and Great Recession.
B. Tax Treatment of Actual versus Shadow Income
Taxpayers who are unaware of the intricacies of the tax code might
find themselves in dire financial straits after engaging in MSSTs because
the IRS’s application of rules from other sections of the tax code apply to
MFRDA, and can result in disqualification of MFDRA’s protection from
tax liability. In particular, the rules under I.R.C. § 121, dealing primarily
with gains from the sale of a principal residence, apply in determining
when a property qualifies as a principal residence under MFDRA. 142
Section 121 is a part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 143 Under §
121, taxpayers who sell their principal residence are entitled to a
permanent exclusion from taxable gross income for capital gains from the
sale of up to $250,000 for individuals, and $500,000 for married couples
filing jointly. The section, in effect, allows taxpayers to keep the wealth
from the sale without any tax consequences. While the exclusion under §
121 is not applicable under MFDRA, some other rules from § 121 apply
to MSSTs subject to MFDRA. For example, taxpayers must own and
occupy their principal residence for at least two calendar years in the last
five years prior to the date of the MSST to qualify for MFDRA protection,

141. Taxpayers are allowed the exclusions from gross income versus adjustable gross income
where taxpayers are allowed deductions to offset the adjustable income or credits allowed against any
ultimate tax liability a taxpayer may owe. As an alternative to exclusion for income under MFDRA,
any tax liability resulting from MSSTs could be offset by a dollar-for-dollar credit to eliminate
taxpayers’ tax liability.
142. I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
143. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997). The law also
created the child tax credit and Roth IRAs for retirement. Id.
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the same as under § 121. 144 While ownership in title cannot be broken
during the five-year period, the occupancy requirement does not have to
be continuous. Thus, if taxpayers engaged in MSSTs in December 2009,
the prior five years run back to 2004, so taxpayers must have occupied the
property for two calendar years with the intent that the property was their
principal residence. However, homeowners who may have been unaware
of the ownership and occupancy rule under § 121 that applied to MFDRA
protection could have easily become subject to tax liability if they missed
the two-year occupancy requirement by even one day.
In addition to the principal residence classification rule under § 121,
the treatment of forgiven indebtedness from MSSTs as taxable income is
unfair because § 121 excludes actual profit from the sale of the principal
residence from taxable income. This aspect of the § 121 exclusion could
have easily been incorporated into MFDRA upon its passage, if the tax
code had been considered in its entirety. And even if Congress considered
§ 121’s exclusion treatment, then it should have addressed the inequality
in the application of § 121 and § 108(a)(1)(E) that creates an unfair penalty
on some taxpayers while rewarding others. In better market conditions,
not affected by a financial crisis or Great Recession, the law is
permanently in place for taxpayers who would have no tax liability for
actual realized monetary gain from the sale of their principal residence
under § 121, in which taxpayers keep the actual money without any tax
recourse. However, in the ongoing depressed market conditions, almost
10 million taxpayers with underwater properties going into 2015 face a
different situation. These homeowners face tax liability if they sell
underwater property and they do not realize any actual money, just a
canceled debt. The tax laws penalize these homeowners. Thus, the
government’s attempt to provide relief to taxpayers has penalized some
taxpayers with underwater property, but has rewarded other taxpayers
who are allowed to walk away with actual profits from the sale of their
property without penalty—an awful disparity in the law that Congress
must correct. Moreover, the problem with underwater properties sold
under MSSTs and the resulting tax liability will perpetuate into the future
without an expansion of MFDRA’s coverage.
C. IRS Collection Actions for Tax Liability Created by MSSTs
For taxpayers who sell their underwater property and who do not
qualify for either MFDRA relief or the insolvency rule under §

144.
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108(a)(1)(B), there is the possibility of facing the burden of not only a tax
liability but also an IRS collection action. The IRS has up to seven years
from the date a taxpayer files a tax return to initiate a collection action for
“substantial misstatement of income,” which would include forgiven
indebtedness. 145 In our example earlier in this section, a $32,000
cancellation of debt may be a substantial misstatement of income
depending on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Not only are
taxpayers subject to an extended collection period, but also the IRS’s
collection action can create devastating hardship on taxpayers, as
Congress has noted in the past. 146
It is likely that millions of taxpayers are unaware of these rules or the
impact on their financial wellbeing until it is too late. To further burden
taxpayers, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove that the property
was a qualified principal residence for the requisite period. If the IRS
challenges the sale as a qualified principal residence, it has up to seven
years from the time the taxpayers filed the tax return in question to seek
collection of the tax liability. This is problematic for taxpayers who may
be unable to produce credible evidence of their intent to claim the
qualified principal residence exclusion under MFDRA after they vacate
the property or rent it. Such an audit by the IRS places further unnecessary
burden and stress on taxpayers, especially in light of the challenging
landscape created by the financial crisis.
Thus, the worst is not over for millions of homeowners who still own
underwater property they cannot sell, or if they do sell will do so with
potential tax liability and face an IRS collection action. Congress’ action
has still not adequately addressed the ongoing problems that persist for
“homeowners involved in the mortgage foreclosure crisis.”
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX POLICY CRISIS
Congress needs to act to resolve the problems of the tax burden
imposed on homeowners who sell underwater property and the disparate
treatment of taxpayers under the current MRFDA. 147 This Part provides a
145. The tax code definition includes “substantial misstatement of income.” See I.R.C. § 6662
(LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15). For the 2014 tax year, in which taxpayer files
returns on April 15, 2015, the seven years runs from April 2015. In addition, while the IRS is able to
waive penalties, it cannot waive interest that accrues for the time the tax liability accrues in April
2015. Id.
146. Unlike creditors, the IRS is not subject to the FDCPA and have almost unrestricted
collection methods for collecting tax liabilities taxpayers owe the government. Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f). In the
author’s humble opinion, it would be better to owe a creditor than the government through the IRS.
147. This could give the perception that they were placing consumers’ interests above their own
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number of important provisions that Congress should include in
congressional corrections to remedy problems with MSSTs.
Until progressive legislative tax reform is enacted, the lending
industry will continue to use MSSTs to its advantage to avoid the liability
of taking title to underwater properties, thus allowing unwary borrowers
to accrue potential tax and resulting financial burdens from these
transactions. Both the government and industry, however, can play an
essential role in relieving the tax burdens of MSSTs for consumers if the
government amends current tax laws and the banking and real estate
industries support the passage of consumer-focused legislation. While the
banking and real estate industries’ support may seem unnatural to
advocates for consumers whose interest may be in direct conflict with
these industries, tangible benefit for these industries and the economy is
attainable, especially by rebuilding a financially healthy consumermarket, which would support a stabilized national economy and future
lending opportunities. Legislators and the banking and real estate
industries could compromise in supporting legislative change in the
following areas: (1) a permanent extension and expansion of MFDRA, (2)
new government-issued disclosures to homeowners, and (3) a permanent
moratorium on the IRS’s collection of taxes related to MSSTs.
A. Extension and Broader Scope of MFDRA
The government should extend MFDRA’s applicability and scope
until underwater property values are at insignificant levels. With the
support of President Barack Obama, Congress extended MFDRA in its
existing form in late December 2015 to cover MSSTs for tax year 2015. 148
The failure of Congress to extend the MFDRA’s coverage beyond 2016,
however, leaves little hope for millions of underwater homeowners who
may not avoid tax liability since they may have to engage in MSSTs
beyond 2016.
Although the main body of the law may not need redrafting, the
government should amend the law to include:
(1) the same exclusion treatment for secondary homes;
profitable interests. Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed, supra note 25.
148. See generally H.R. 3856 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014):
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Homeowners Debt Relief Extension Act of 2014.
Section 2. Extension of exclusion from gross income of discharge of qualified principal residence
indebtedness
(a) In general—Subparagraph (E) of section 108(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 is amended by striking January 1, 2014 and inserting January 1, 2016.
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(2) the inclusion of any principal residence that changed status due
to economic hardship but qualified as a principal residence anytime after
2007;
(3) an exclusion from taxable income similar to the I.R.C. § 121, for
either a principal residence or a secondary residence; 149 and
(4) extension of these provisions until the underwater property
market is eliminated, or at a superficial volume.
These amendments would provide real and practical solutions for
taxpayers. Only the taxpayers that truly need the relief of MFDRA would
use it because the scope and coverage would be broad enough to redress
only the tax liability issue of underwater principal and secondary
residences, not any other type of investment property. Congress would
also have the power to repeal the law when MFDRA’s full usefulness is
exhausted and there are no longer huge numbers of taxpayers under the
burden of ownership of underwater property.
The banking and real estate industries should have little reason to
oppose such reform, but in fact may benefit by urging the support of this
legal reform because these proposals of law do not threaten their interests
and would eliminate their need to take any adverse action against their
own profitable interests. Because millions of American properties are still
underwater, this pragmatic solution would protect millions of
homeowners from further financial distress. Public policy calls for the
government to rescue consumers by taking action within its powers.
B. The Disclosure Regime—Government Duty to Disclose
Some perceive disclosure laws as the strongest consumer weapons
against asymmetry of information, but creditors have been most willing
to undermine this method of regulation. 150 Indeed, the financial and real
149. Under I.R.C. § 121 (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15), the government,
through the Tax Code, allows anyone who sells a principal residence to exclude from one’s taxable
income any profits, or gain, from the sale of the property; single persons up to $250,000, married
persons up to $500,000. This class of consumers does not have to pay taxes on this profit from the
sale that appreciated in value, either through their own improvements or maybe just due to market
forces. The reverse should also hold true because consumers who failed to make a profit on the sale
of a principal residence are unfairly penalized, especially in this unique world where MSSTs evolved
due to market conditions that the lending industry facilitated and the real estate industry perpetuated
to both industries’ very profitable ends.
150. See Tracie R. Porter, The Field Between Lions and Zebras . . . Evening the Playing Field
Between Lenders and Borrowers: Conflicts of Interest and Legal Obligations in the Residential
Mortgage Transaction, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 623, 631 (2012) [hereinafter Porter, Conflicts of
Interest]. See also Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing
but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 209-11 (2008)
(finding that most borrowers do not sufficiently understand how this information is processed by
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estate industries have viewed disclosure legislation as extremely intrusive
regulation of their industries. The Banking and Financial Services
Industry (BFSI) and Realtors Associations have engaged in massive
lobbying efforts against disclosure regulation whenever possible,
including the Truth in Lending Act and some aspects of the Wall Street
Reform Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Act, also known
as the Dodd-Frank Act. 151 The disclosure solution proposed here,
however, is different from those already in effect, in that it protects
consumers not against the perils of dealing with the industry players but
in dealing with the government through the IRS. The complexity of tax
laws inherently creates asymmetry of information for taxpayers, which
subjects them to tax liability that, once created, is almost impossible to get
relief from.
When homeowners use MSSTs, unlike situations in which
consumers buy a home, refinance a home, buy a car, or even lease
property, lenders and Realtors are not required by law to inform
consumers of any potential onerous financial, or tax, consequences of
engaging in MSSTs. To the contrary, once lenders approve MSSTs, they
are not required to report the transaction until months after MSSTs are
consummated and the property sells. Under the proposed new disclosure
approach, the government, through the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), would be required to give all borrowers with underwater
properties disclosures explaining the potential tax implications from
MSSTs on a quarterly basis until the property is no longer considered an
underwater property. 152 A quarterly basis is preferred in case homeowners
attempt to engage in MSSTs, which take several months for lenders to
lenders, or how to evaluate information in the legal disclosures—if they understand the disclosed
information at all). Disclosures are arguably an ineffective method for protecting and educating
consumers about mortgage industry practices. Id. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 65 (referring to
Truth in Lending Act disclosures and noting that “Judge Posner pointed [out] . . . ‘[n]ot all persons
are capable of being careful readers”‘).
151. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f). The BFSI and Realtors Associations
have engaged in massive lobbying efforts against disclosure whenever possible, such as with the
CARD Act. Id.
152. See HAFA, supra note 39 (providing text of Short Sale Agreement the government posted
to the website for borrowers). The text reads:
The difference between the remaining amounts of principal you owe and the amount that
we receive from the sale must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on Form
1099C, as debt forgiveness. In some cases, debt forgiveness could be taxed as income. The
amount, if any, we pay you or your tenant for moving expenses may also be reported as
income. We suggest that you contact the IRS or your tax preparer to determine if you may
have any tax liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
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come to an agreement. In the alternative, the CFPB would submit a notice
through lenders in monthly mortgage statements. The cost to the CFPB
would be administrative, which to an agency charged with oversight and
reporting on financial institutions in order to protect consumers is a
nominal cost compared to the financial devastation that could result from
tax liability for homeowners who engage in MSSTs. Thus, disclosure
through the government’s CFPB is likely the most reliable method of
getting the homeowners attention about the tax implications for selling
underwater property. 153 The government also benefits from the public
good it does for its citizens by protecting them at the outset of the
transaction and expending fewer resources than when instituting tax
collection actions against taxpayers.
In MSSTs, the consumers’ biggest adversary is the IRS, not the
lenders or Realtors; therefore, neither industry has any real reasons to
oppose such reforms in the disclosure laws. More importantly, the
potential tax liability to taxpayers is too great to ignore the necessity of
information needed to make an informed decision about MSSTs.
C. Permanent Moratorium on IRS’s Collection of Tax Liability Resulting
from MSSTs
Congress should also place a permanent moratorium on the
collection of tax liability resulting from MSSTs until the real estate market
in many jurisdictions stabilizes and underwater properties in the market
are insignificant in nature. Similar to the April 2014 letter of
understanding the IRS issued to the State of California in which the IRS
stated that it would not enforce collection against taxpayers in California,
the government and IRS can maintain a similar stance with all taxpayers
who sell their homes through MSSTs and face possible tax liability.
The collection actions of the IRS are the most aggressive of any
vendor in any industry so such a permanent moratorium would stop
aggressive collection actions that often result in unbearable financial and
psychological effects from the IRS’s sometimes futile attempts to collect
tax revenues. In pursuing collection, the government, through the IRS,
153. See Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 150. They must then provide consumers with
a cooling period to seek representation on the issue of at least five business days so that consumers
can get un-conflicted legal or financial advice from a professional best suited to represent their
interests. The delay in transaction is no more onerous on the lenders and Realtors than any other
disclosure required for the transactions that the government deemed important to protect consumer
rights such as the three-day grace period for refinancing homes. Another option is to provide lenders
with a safe harbor protection for early reporting of the 1099-C event, at such time as lenders present
the MSSTs offer to borrowers so borrowers still have time to cancel the deal and pursue other options.
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places a burden on consumers that need not exist and for a transaction that
lenders walk away from with little or no losses while consumers continue
to suffer. Thus, the government should initiate a permanent moratorium
on collection of any potential revenues generated from MSSTs. Moreover,
the potential lost tax revenue is insignificant, especially in comparison to
§ 121 discussion above where the government is willing to forego tax
revenues on real profits from a sale of property, foregoing substantial
revenues that can actually be collected, versus uncollectable revenues
from shadow income from MSSTs.
As of April 2014, California is the only state with a special agreement
with the IRS that allows its residences to avoid tax liability from MSSTs
regardless of solvency, but only related to principal residences. On April
29, 2014, the IRS issued a letter of understanding (LOU) to the Honorable
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA). 154 The LOU included the IRS’s response
to the Senator’s request and clarified the IRS’s letter, dated September 19,
2013, in which Senator Boxer addressed the question of whether
cancellation of indebtedness from a lender-approved [mortgage] short sale
would be considered taxable income for California homeowners. 155
California passed an anti-deficiency judgment statute, under California
Civil Procedure Act § 580e, that prevents lenders who foreclose on
principal residences from collecting any deficiency judgments resulting
from foreclosures. Section 580e only applies to qualified principal
residences that homeowners acquired with purchase money mortgage
loans. 156 Section 580e treats the deficiency for cancelled mortgage
amounts as a non-recourse debt obligation. Thus, for federal tax purposes,
the IRS agreed not to treat the cancellation of indebtedness as taxable
income based on Section 580e.
This limited exception for California homeowners with underwater
principal residences 157 should not apply to only California taxpayers when
the impact of the financial crisis affected all U.S. taxpayers. Additionally,
this limited circumstance in California created by Section 580e does not

154. Letter of Understanding, DEPT. OF THE TREAS., IRS, No. 2014-0018 (Apr. 29, 2014),
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0018.pdf.
155. The letter of understanding and CA law do not apply to non-judicial foreclosures or
mortgage loan modifications. See infra, note 161.
156. Section 580e requires that the mortgage loan is the only secured indebtedness against the
property, so there are no second lien holders. The law applies to dwellings of not more than four units.
The lender must consent in writing to the MSST, indicating that the loan will be tendered, and
ultimately is tendered, to the lender at less than the outstanding balance owed. Title must transfer to
a third-party buyer and be recorded. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (LEXIS, through Chapter 11 of
the 2016 Regular Session and Chapter 3 of the 2015-16 2nd Extraordinary Session).
157. Supra note 93.
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reflect the various situations that impact taxpayers across the country with
underwater properties that may no longer qualify as principal residences.
The IRS even stated in its original September 19, 2013, letter to Senator
Boxer that, although other states have enacted anti-deficiency judgment
statutes, the letter only limited the consequences under California Civil
Procedure Act, Section 580e. 158 The LOU with California reveals that the
IRS is not myopic but will act when pressed by legislators, even if
informally through an LOU. Formal action, through legislation passed by
Congress, that creates equal treatment for all taxpayers is paramount.
D. Government Paternalist Action Required
Governmental paternalist action is warranted to assist in resolving
the problem of tax liability that accompanies MSST transactions.
Congress is in a better position to protect taxpayers and to inform them
about the tax consequences of MSSTs than are Realtors or lenders through
provisions contained in sales contracts or MSST agreements. Realtors and
lenders also inherently have a conflict of interest with homeowners given
their motivation to sell the property for commission in regard to Realtors
and to minimize liability and increase profitability for lenders. 159 At a
minimum, the government, through agencies like the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), should assure that borrowers with underwater
properties who are considering MSSTs receive all pertinent information
about the tax rules and consequences before engaging in MSSTs. The
CFPB, to which some mortgage lenders report, should provide the
information to all homeowners with underwater properties so that
taxpayers are allowed adequate time to consider or to seek counseling
about how to avoid the tax liability associated with MSSTs. However,
informing taxpayers about tax liability is just one thing Congress can
mandate to ensure consumer protection.
Legislative reform by extending MFDRA and expanding the tax
rules that apply under MFDRA is another means Congress can use to
protect homeowners using MSSTs to relieve their financial burdens. The
disparity in tax treatment between solvent and insolvent taxpayers 160
158. Letter of Understanding, No. 2013-0036, supra note 119.
159. Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 150. Furthermore, they are not qualified tax
advisors, they may be unaware of the implications of the rules on the particular taxpayer or
inadequately knowledgeable about the rules themselves, or they might not want to manage the conflict
of interest that exists between their own interest to close the deal versus what is in the best interest of
the taxpayer/borrower/homeowner. Id.
160. The mortgage lending industry further perpetuated the gambling by using insolvent
taxpayers (through the riskiest lending standards, such as no documentation loans) as pawns for the
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related to MSSTs is so significant that Congress must take action to
protect homeowners. Congress’s expansion of the law to address, in a
practical way, the hardship taxpayers could face will put taxpayers in a
better financial position in the long-run and may alleviate the need for
costly and stressful foreclosure actions, for both lenders and homeowners.
Until then, the Tax Code should continue to provide leniency for all
taxpayers who may realize tax liability from cancellation of indebtedness
due to MSSTs into the future until only a de minimis portion, not ten
million, of the properties in the national real estate market remain
underwater; an ongoing consequence of the “mortgage foreclosure crisis
still affecting most of the United States.” 161
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must provide a solution to the quagmire of financial
indebtedness that is promoted by current tax policy associated with
MSSTs. The massive introduction of MSSTs following the 2007 financial
crisis and subsequent mortgage foreclosure crisis created a financial
quagmire for many homeowners that Congress has not effectively
resolved. This Article has outlined how Congress can and should act to
relieve middle-class taxpayers of the burden of substantial federal tax
liability that currently results when lenders forgive indebtedness of
homeowners through the use of MSSTs. For the still-evolving, residential
real estate landscape that includes almost ten million homeowners who
own underwater properties, Congress must enact a broader, more
comprehensive law that adequately addresses the continuing crisis in the
residential real estate market. The alternative is that middle-class
taxpayers with underwater properties, including both principal and
secondary residences, will continue to suffer severe financial impacts
under the tax code when they sell underwater property using lendercontrolled and approved MSSTs. 162
Further, in order for the government to prevent perpetuation of the
most risky mortgage products ever introduced into the residential mortgage market. See Porter, Pawns
for the Higher Greed, supra note 25; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61.
161. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15) treats discharged
indebtedness as gross taxable income. See DEIER ET AL., supra note 2 (identifying the many zip codes
in minority communities impacted by property devaluations). If citizens are experiencing hardship
and unable to survive financially, the health of the economy suffers because citizens have no money
for stimulating spending in the markets, more citizens may need greater government assistance for
survival, and the progression to economic recovery and stability is stifled at a slow pace for middleclass Americans. See generally id.
162. The Tax Code already provides relief for insolvent taxpayers under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B)
(LEXIS, through PL 114-115, approved 12/28/15).
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misconception to homeowners that the lending 163 and real estate
industries’ facilitation of residential MSSTs are financially beneficial to
homeowners, 164 Congress must provide relief through federal legislative
tax reform. Among other provisions, the reform should extend the
MFRDA until the number of underwater properties is insignificant, and it
should amend MFDRA to include a broader scope of coverage for
principal and secondary residences. The tax code should also be amended
to consistently apply rules for true profit gains under § 121 versus shadow
profits from cancellation of indebtedness from MSSTs under § 108. The
proposal would also require the government to disseminate disclosures
through the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, effectively informing
borrowers with underwater properties of the tax consequences of
engaging in MSSTs and that, currently, the federal government through
the IRS may initiate onerous collection actions against taxpayers.
Effective public policy in relation to tax reform should not only
change specific provisions of the law, but it should also do so to
implement social policy that reflects the social values of American
citizens. The 2007 financial crisis was a catastrophic earthquake the aftershocks of which are still being felt and will continue for many years to
come. The government can and should come to its citizens’ aid in this
ongoing crisis, and it should resurrect long-standing American policies
that promote and protect homeownership.

163.

“BFSI” is a term coined by the author. See Porter, Pawns for the Higher Greed, supra note

25.
164. The majority of solvent middle-class taxpayers in need of tax relief are already in higher
income tax brackets than lenders who receive favorable corporate tax rates. Although the U.S.
Corporate Tax Rate is between 15% and 35%, most large corporations find a way to zero out their tax
liability. Matt Krantz, Large Companies Find a Way to Zero Tax Rate, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/10/23/big-companies-pay-no-taxes/2480281/.
A surprising number of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500, 57, have found ways to pay effective
tax rates of zero, according to a USA Today analysis of data from S&P Capital IQ. The news comes
months after the Government Accountability Office released a report showing that companies in 2010
reported an average effective tax rate of 12.6%, well below the 35% federal corporate tax rate. Id.
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